THE POLITICS OF MASS DEATHS (Onek Adyanga)

THE POLITICS OF MASS DEATHS: HUMAN BODY PARTS, HUMAN REMAINS AND WAR PROPAGANDA IN MUSEVENI’S UGANDA

Introduction
The policy of public display of human body parts and human remains has a long history in warfare. Whether for cultural reasons of heroism and gallantry, sadistic and psychopathological reasons or a measure of attrition rate of the enemy, this grotesque but ingenious display of human body parts and human remains has powerful propaganda value. The propaganda values include, but are not limited to, justifying militarism and aggressive genocidal wars, demonizing imagined enemies, mobilizing donor community support, generating and sustaining regime relevance and legitimization of violence. Since the NRM/A regime came to power in 1986, the public display of human remains has been central to its demonization project, legitimizing the regime, and garnering western support. Whenever General Yoweri Museveni’s legitimacy is threatened, a guided tour of Luweero is organized to display human remains and body parts. Museveni conducted many of these tours with the diplomatic corps in 1996. In the subsequent years and most recently in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, he took western ambassadors to Luweero (The New Vision, May 19, 2006). Among the African presidents he recently took to Luweero, was the President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete (Monitor Online, 2006). Again, about the middle of this year, May 2006, he summoned and took members of western diplomatic corps to Luweero where he claimed publicly that a former United Nations Under-Secretary for Children in Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, was responsible for the atrocities represented by the display. In spite of the numerous accusations and public showings of human remains and body parts, there has never been any prosecution of perpetrators. Why is it that we hear the loudest and persistent accusations for Luweero deaths by General Museveni, but no prosecution of the alleged perpetrators of the crime? What purposes are Luweero atrocities serving the NRM/A regime of General Museveni? What impact has the consistent allegation, without court conviction, on the struggle to control the public history and public memory of Luweero deaths?
This analysis examines the struggle to accurately present public history and historical memory in view of Museveni’s transformation of Luweero deaths into a practical political tool of ethno-xenophobia, demonization of imagined political opponents, concealment of genocide and harnessing ethnic and western donor legitimacy to govern. Emphasis on Luweero deaths and the many sites of massacres must be seen as exposure and disclosure that not only challenge the self-celebratory NRM/A narratives, but tell the truth to restrain manipulators of such tragedies who seek political relevance and personal aggrandizement. Luweero atrocities and those in other parts of the country are Ugandan deaths. These deaths are Uganda’s tragic history of the folly of NRM/A militarism and megalomania to extra-constitutionally gain political power. General Museveni, a presidential candidate for the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), was defeated by Sam Kuteesa, a Democratic Party (DP) contender and brother in-law of Museveni in the 1981 general election (The Monitor, October 9, 2006, “Museveni Challenges Kuteesa’s win”). Kuteesa is now serving as a foreign minister in the NRM/A regime. Instead of Museveni following the recommendation of the Commonwealth Election Observer team to abide by the verdict of the court; he resorted to war, a crime of breach of peace, leading to the mass deaths around the country.
Researchers may encounter a public often unwilling to read critical analyses that challenge political myths and call into question comfortable and self-righteous assumptions that have sustained the NRM/A regime and its beneficiaries. The truth, however, must be spoken clearly and selflessly. In the absence of a balanced account in which the voices of all the actors in Luweero and other infamous sites of massacres can be heard, the marginalized will often devise counter narratives to explain the disjunction between their demonization and the NRM/A celebratory official account. Fashioned by deep, well-founded suspicions and political logic to counter deception, propaganda and demonization, these counter narratives can be as difficult to dislodge as the official NRM/A self-celebratory version they seek to undermine.
We must adopt a more critical and interpretive sense of the past beyond complacency and political comfort levels. Failing to do that, we will be paralyzed by the fanatical propaganda and deception of the NRM/A regime and its political and military elites which revise history, remake and exploit the memory of the Luweero and other sites of massacres for political gains. We must also direct the consciousness of Ugandans to hardcore historical facts rather than to NRM/A deliberately manufactured political and social myths to legitimize ethno-nationalism and governance. Those found guilty, through trial in a competent court of law, of commission of atrocities in Luweero, Teso, Lango, Acholi, West Nile and western Uganda, and profiting from peddling the tragedy must be punished for the war crimes.

1. THE NRM/A AND ATROCITIES: HUMAN REMAINS AND BODY PARTS
Contemporary debates on Luweero deaths must be solidly grounded in the knowledge of history, but not in political mythmaking, which is often characterized by exploitation of deaths and tragedy for personal interests. This debate must take place in a public arena because Luwero deaths have a greater presence in the national psyche than any events in Uganda’s history since the NRM/A came to power in 1986.
To understand the politics of death, it is imperative to revisit Museveni’s undergraduate thesis, Fanon’s theory of violence: Its verification in liberated Mozambique (1971), at the University of Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania. In glorifying violence and death, Yoweri Museveni writes, “violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and give the key to them.” Museveni continued to show the potency of organizing violence and displaying human remains and body parts as tools of war. He writes,

In Mozambique, it has been found necessary to show peasants fragments of a Portuguese soldier blown up by a mine or, better still, his head. Once the peasants sees guerillas holding the head of the former master, the white man’s head cold in death, the white skin, flowing hair, pointed nose and blue eyes notwithstanding, he will know, or at least begin to suspect, that the picture traditionally presented to him of the white man’s invincibility is nothing but a scarecrow. However, once the peasants’ passions are aroused, they usually swing to the other extreme; that all white men are devils… This position is not entirely wrong...

The despicable act of displaying severed heads of dead human victims for propaganda purposes must be seen within that context. General Museveni and associates regarded the slaughtered white men with amused contempt. We must take seriously that this act was not a simple matter of youthful student bravado. The mutilations, public display of severed heads and body parts were raised to a level of military and political policy in the NRM/A conduct of warfare in Uganda from 1981 to the present.
Luweero would offer the first war theater for such despicable utility and public display of human heads and body parts during Museveni’s military campaign from 1981-1986. Subsequent Uganda war theaters from 1986 to the present time would experience their share. In attempting to understand atrocities and war in a political debate on April 18th 2006, involving NRM Members of Parliaments from northern and eastern Uganda, Andrew Mwenda, a Kampala radio anchor for KFM 93.3, quoted the late Apolo Milton Obote. He said,

Museveni has for the last twenty three years fought different enemies in different regions of Uganda: Uganda National Liberation Armies (UNLA) in Luwero, Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) in the north, West Nile Bank Front, Uganda People’s Army of Peter Otai in Teso, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in western Uganda, and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). In all these wars, the adversaries are different, the theaters of war different, the periods different. There are only two elements that are constant: Museveni on the one hand and massive atrocities against civilians on the other.

Mwenda asked,

What does this tell us? How can it be that all Museveni’s adversaries in the different regions of Uganda, under different political organizations, and at different historical times fight the same way? Is it not logical that since Museveni and atrocities is the only constant, that it is Museveni who employs atrocities to win wars?

Certainly, the cynical manipulation of atrocities as political and military policy of warfare in Uganda implicate Museveni in atrocities, mass murders, war crimes and crimes against humanity beginning from wars in Luweero and spreading to the rest of Uganda. It is important to cite a few:

· “Terror and Massacres of Muslims in Ankole in June 1979” (Uganda Government. Report of the Human Rights Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, 1981,p.31)
· “Abduction and Assassinations of Civilians” (Amnesty International, Uganda, August, 1981,p.1)
· “Attacks on Civilian Vehicles” (Africa Research Bulletin, December 1-31, 1981: 6289BC)
· The late Dr. Andrew Lutakome Kayira, eyewitness report after meeting Museveni at the NRA command post in Luweero said,

There were no less than 50 heads at a quick count. We found Museveni and the NRA soldiers inside the ring of human heads. Museveni told us while pointing at the heads. You see those heads? That is how I deal with those who do not agree with me. (Cited in Muwanga and Gombya, The Pearl of Africa is Bleeding)

· “Massacres of Civilians in Luweero while disguised as UNLA Soldiers” (Lance-Sera Mwanga, Violence in Uganda: What is inside Museveni’s Uganda; Mwanga and Gombya, The Pearl of Africa is Bleeding; A.J. McIlroy, in Luweero, The Daily Telegraph, London, on 16th August, 1984.
· Cooking 28 massacred civilians in pots in Gang pa Aculu in Omot, Pader, northern Uganda, on October 28, 2002 (See, Dr. James Rwanyarare, New Vision, October 28, 2002; The Monitor, November 14, 2002).

The use of atrocities would become bolder as the insurgencies drew longer, changed phases and emphases; and senior NRM/A members refashioned new political parties. The blame for the atrocities would metamorphose into a bold political strategy to demonize, blackmail, malign and obstruct justice for the purpose of NRM/A legitimization and governance. The ferocity of the exploitation of Luweero deaths to silence and malign any political opposition that drew attention to the genocide in northern Uganda would increase exponentially.

2. THE POLITICAL UTILITY OF LUWERO DEATHS TO THE NRM/A REGIME
[a] Muffling western donor criticisms and generating ethno-xenophobic hate and anger of victims towards the alleged perpetrators.
The exploitation of the Luweero human remains and body parts, as a weapon to generate hate and anger in victims, is here exemplified as the most lethal weapon of war beyond dispute in the conflicts in Uganda. This act by the NRM/A regime stoked ethno-xenophobic hate and anger of victims against alleged perpetrators. The exposure of human remains became the official NRM/A trump card and policy for dealing with political opponents of the regime, and predominantly those living in northern and eastern parts of Uganda.
Whenever General Museveni NRM/A regime comes under attack for human rights violations, he would personally take ambassadors accredited to Uganda to Luweero mass graves, where he would officially vilify “killers” and make more accusations to justify his human rights records. On May 18, 2006, Henry Mukasa, a New Vision journalist, quotes Museveni:

The purpose of your coming here with me is because some of your countries have interest in the human rights situation in Uganda especially European countries. As human beings, it’s okay but you should do so with knowledge.

Museveni continued,

Because you don’t know, instead of being part of the solution, you can be part of the problem. To cure this, I am going to partner with you to enable you to know Uganda so that when you talk, you don’t talk from ignorance.

A selected group of NRM youths were assembled to heckle the diplomats at Nakaseke: The NRM/A youth hecklers jeered,

They tell lies, false propaganda, trying to turn black into white about human rights in Uganda and these (ambassadors) become the loudspeakers.

The convergence of NRM youth hecklers and official propaganda of Luweero deaths as a political tool of blackmailing western diplomats worked, to some extent. In western capitals and official relations, Museveni’s human rights abuses are being carefully sanitized and the narratives are scripted to exclusively implicate NRM/A’s political opponents, in spite of glaring facts to the contrary. Any attempts to raise the violations of the NRM/A regime by critics are usually ignored and deemed unnecessary and malicious.
At the domestic level, its application has stoked ethno-xenophobic hate and call for vicious revenge against the “killers.” On November 18, 2002, Joshua Kato, a New Vision journalist reports the effectiveness of the policy of NRM/A official functionaries inculcating hatred in the example of 74 pupils between the ages of 12 to 13 years. These children were displaced by war in northern Uganda and brought to take their national examination from Luweero. Fred Sserukenya, a teacher said, “We decided to bring them to Kampala so that they sit for their exams in more comfortable environment.” This was not to be: Edward Kawooya, the Local Council 1 (LC1), accused the pupils of posing “a serious security risk” and directed that the pupils be evicted in 48 hours. A pupil cried, “Have mercy on me,” and another, “I don’t want to miss my exams,” tears welling in his young eyes. They continuously pleaded, “We want to sit our exams. Whatever happens, let us be allowed to sit our exams even if it is on the streets of Kampala.” The blaming of Luweero deaths upon the northerners was responsible for such official policy. Where is the sense of nationhood and nationalism if official policy blames innocent young citizens who were born many years after the Luweero insurgency was over and have nothing to do with past records of alleged atrocities? Such actions are best understood as arising from a regime whose power base is ethno-nationalists and its lifeblood is stoking ethno-xenophobic hate and anger.

[b] Blackmailing political opponents and critics of the NRM/A regime
[i] In Notes on the concealment of Genocide, the late Apollo Milton Obote accuses Museveni for committing atrocities against Ugandans in Luweero, while masquerading as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). General Museveni fired back that Obote must answer for the atrocities of the UNLA, in Luweero. Obote’s accusation of Museveni’s NRM/A gained support from the Luweero report of A.J. McIlroy of the The Daily Telegraph, London, on 16th August, 1984.

And Mr. Nusur Jogojogo, the area chief, later told me [McIlroy]:

Three months ago, seven villagers were killed; three men and four children were shot or hacked to death by men with pangas and guns. They were bandits; there is no doubt about that. Some of them were from our village. They were dressed half way, I mean they were in Army and civilian clothes, all mixed up.

By the time the soldiers arrived, the people had fled into the bush. Whatever possessions they left behind, were looted by the soldiers.

McIlroy’s report is corroborated by a serving UPDF officer (former NRA), Col. Kutesa. He writes in his book entitled, Uganda’s Revolution: How I Saw It, (2006): “they (NRA) dressed in UNLA uniform and green coats, they [his NRA colleagues] mingled with the government soldiers and infiltrated…”
Col. Kutesa had made such a claim before he published his book. During an interview with William Pike on Capital Radio in Kampala in 1995, in a program called Desert Island Disc, he told Pike that he was “a Lieutenant in the UNLA but as an NRA infiltrator whose mission was to undermine the credibility of the army from within.” Similarly, the Monitor Newspaper of April 15, 2005, carried a report that as officer in-charge of the road block at Konge, Kutesa would harass civilians, rob them of their money and kill some.
It went on to say that Generals Kahinda Otafire and Elly Tumwine boasted at the funeral of the late Adonia Tiberondwa of similar kind of machinations and deception to delegitimize the regime of Obote and win local support. Certainly, atrocities committed against civilians with the purpose of achieving a political and military victory worked, especially when the adversary took the blame for it. As an effective weapon, the use of atrocities for political gain would become clearer during the last political competition between incumbent President Museveni and Besigye, a former physician to Museveni during the NRM/A guerilla was in Luweero. Besigye and other former members of the NRM/A high command who fought alongside Museveni against the UNLA were blamed for the Luweero atrocities. Yet these military commanders were firsthand witnesses to the deaths and destruction of the war Museveni launched after losing the election to a DP candidate. The former colleagues grew furious and warned Museveni to stop blackmailing them for cheap political ends.

[ii] Blackmailing former NRM/A guerrilla colleagues, turned political critics.
In the electoral challenge of 23 February, 2006, Museveni blamed the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) leaders: Col. (Rtd) Kizza Besigye, Major General Mugisha Muntu, Major Rubaramira Ruranga and John Kazoora, for the atrocities in Luweero. Put simply, shifting the blame for Luweero deaths upon his former guerilla colleagues served as a strategy to shift internal alliance and deny them legitimacy in the southern part of the country; and Museveni, unblemished, remained the defender of the southern ethnic political power elite.
The retired FDC military officers who served loyally under Museveni’s NRM/A and witnessed the ferocity of the war responded in anger. Major Ruranga, of the UPDF (former NRA), who fought alongside General Museveni during the Luweero war from 1981-1986, when the atrocities were committed, writes in the New Vision, July 12, 2005:

…the killings in Luweero during the civil strife must be blamed on the National Resistance Army (NRA) that started the war.

Major Ruranga continued,

I hear many people claiming that Obote killed people in Luweero. Obote could have done something wrong but Museveni did many bad things. I was in NRM with Museveni and people in Luweero were used as shields by us. I saw many people die, not only from bullet but also from hunger.

So for someone to say NRA did not kill people and that former regimes were more bloody than this one is not true because there is no war where two sides are shooting in a cross fire and only one side gets casualties.

Another demonized retired UPDF (former NRA) military officer, Kazoora, Kashari Member of Parliament, who fought alongside Museveni spoke of his personal dossier on the 1981-86 Luweero war on November 8, 2005, while responding to Museveni’s accusation of Luweero deaths. He writes,

Some of us have deliberately kept quiet about Luweero war …it would be wrong for one side to accuse the other of committing crimes in Luweero

I thought that we were fighting for democracy. Little did I know that we were fighting to make one man, Museveni a life President.

Col. Besigye (Rtd), presidential torchbearer for FDC, and former personal physician to General Museveni, who fought alongside Museveni during the Luweero war, supports and emphasizes Kazoora and Ruranga’s statements. In an interview with Andrew Mwenda, on KFM’s Tonight on October 27, a day after he returned from exile, Col. Besigye acknowledged that the NRM/A, which he was part of, could share the blame in the Luweero killings.

Col. (rtd) Besigye said,

In a war, all parties are there to kill either in defense or aggression. We need to investigate who killed who, for the purposes of resolving future conflicts. It’s not good for one party to lay charges on others. People (forces) of all parties could be culpable.

The FDC former NRM/A military officers-turned-regime political critics, unleashed the wrath of President Museveni’s press office. Responding with more accusations and blame for atrocities, Ofwono Opondo, published an opinion piece in the New Vision, on August 26, 2005, in which he shifts the blame for atrocities onto General Muntu, the longest serving Army commander of the NRA/M, who is currently in-charge of FDC mobilization, and Besigye, as FDC presidential candidate.

Opondo writes,

If Muntu was seeking comprehensive justice for all, how come he is not talking for the 39 who died (read roasted alive) in Mukura wagon (Teso), Bur Cor (Acholi, where scores of people were buried alive), when he was Army commander?

He continues,

Indeed, the politicians from northern Uganda, including ministers like Omara Atubo and Zackary Olum, whose sober accounts of torture while being arrested and in detention between 1990 and 1993, should not seek redress lest they (meaning Muntu and Besigye) are called to judgment.

And further, FDC leaders falsely believe that 1986-98 when they were the bosses is now so far away, and it would be better to forget.

Opondo wanted to blackmail Gen. Muntu into silence when he referred to atrocities committed against civilians in eastern and northern Uganda by NRA, for which Muntu bore command responsibility. He was silent on the fact that as president and commander-in-chief of the NRA, Gen. Museveni bore the final command responsibility. In his address to the Langi and Acholi Resistance Councils (RCs) and elders, Museveni had once admitted to atrocities under Gen. Muntu. He said,

Sometimes, our own indisciplined soldiers took advantage of the breakdown of law and order caused by the rebellion and committed atrocities against the civilian population. (New Vision, March 28, 1994)

The admission followed similarly, “mass rapes and other atrocities by the NRA,” (New Vision, January 1, 1988; New Vision, February 22, 1988, etc), for which Muntu and other retired officers were in active service and gained rapid promotions.

The open acknowledgment by President Museveni, Gen. Muntu (rtd), Col. Besigye (rtd) and the other retired UPDF officers have not been followed with criminal convictions and a truth and reconciliation commission. We must be clear that the blackmailing of Gen. Muntu, Col. Besigye and others was because they would deny Museveni the free utility of atrocities for political legitimacy, to consolidate an ethno-xenophobic and militarist regime and to conceal the current genocide in northern Uganda.

[c] Consolidating an ethno-xenophobic and militarist state, a genocidal and divisive administration
By consistently inciting maniacal feelings of revenge and contempt, which functions to support the northern genocide, the NRM/A has successfully divided the country along ethnic lines. Andrew M. Mwenda writes in The Monitor newspaper, April 26, 2004,

It does not pay for other MPs to follow colleagues from Acholi, Lango and Teso in walking out of parliament because that does not advance their electoral fortunes. The war in northern Uganda has therefore been contained in the prism of an ethnic conflict affecting only the Acholi, or Langi, and the Iteso, rather than a national problem.

Mwenda continues his observation in The Monitor, May 6-12, 2006:

The war in the north has always been used to rally people in the south around the NRM and Mzee (Museveni) during election times by spreading imaginary fears that “northerners want to come back to power to kill us.” This cynical and highly ethicized politics was effectively employed during the 1996 presidential election campaigns. Some FM radio stations ran adverts of soldiers with a northern accent torturing and killing people at roadblocks. Newspapers also carried adverts of skulls… But to keep the ethicized campaigns against the north, it is politically necessary to brand them (political competitors) agents of “those northerners” by linking them either to Obote or Kony. It is this process of demonizing people from the north…that is the basis of Mzee’s regime.

The consolidation of ethno-xenophobic policy thrives on the devious NRM/A regime’s self-celebratory memory. This is often invoked in the name of nation, ethnicity and perpetuates the need for revenge. The lifeblood of the ethno-xenophobia is deliberately manufactured myths to conceal complicity in genocide against the northerners. Its practical policy is militarism and militarist ethno-xenophobic and chauvinistic governance.
The 41-page report entitled, Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict, by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) released on April 15, 2004 agrees,

The war helps him justify and maintain the status quo in Uganda politics, denying his opposition a power base and offering numerous opportunities for curtailing freedom of expression and association in the name of “the war against terrorism”.

The State House acting presidential press secretary rubbished the report describing it as “ridiculous and the work of research tourists.” To be clear, the ICG is chaired by former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, and run by former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans. Both have clear credentials in democratic governance.
Similarly, a political science professor, Joel D. Barkan, of the University of Iowa, writes in The Weekly Observer newspaper on 4 August 2005,

The war has served Museveni’s political purpose in two fundamental ways. First, it has helped him consolidate popular support across southern Uganda, and particularly among the Baganda…. Second, the war has shored up Museveni’s political base within the UPDF; the UPDF has always been a pillar of the regime.

President Museveni supports Professor Barkan when he added that the high ranking military officers needed the war to amass wealth, hence consolidating his political base (New Vision, November 29, 1996). Museveni said,

It is true that in the past army officers were doing business out of the suffering of Acholi and they did not want it [the war] to end.

The tragedy of Acholi people has become a necessary Trojan horse to accumulate wealth among the high ranking military officers. A government’s own investigation into the Ghost Soldier reports by Mbabazi/Generals Tinyefuza and Saleh, showed that about 50 percent of the UPDF payroll was inflated with “ghost soldiers”. Unfortunately, no prosecution has even been undertaken; and, most of the implicated officers have gained rapid promotions.


[d] The NRM/A and genocide against the Acholi population
The genocide imposed on the Acholi people is fabricated as being the result of the mass deaths committed in Luweero; instead of the Acholi people remaining as a formidable political opponent of the NRM/A regime. It follows that numerous accusations have been concocted to implicate the Acholi people and to justify their decimation by the NRM/A regime. John Muto-Ono P’Lajur, a journalist for The Monitor newspaper, reports on April 5, 2004, of a Luweero meeting from March 4-7, to which Acholi elders and religious leaders were invited to apologize to the Baganda victims. The Acholi leaders rejected the invitation saying that they never fought the Baganda, even in ancient history. Many Acholi councilors described the meeting as “unfair and meant to justify the ongoing war” [genocide] against them.
Gulu Local Council-V Chairperson (LC-V), Lt.Col. Walter Ochora, an Acholi and former commander in Luweero with the defunct UNLA, turned a staunch supporter of the NRM/A in Gulu, said, “Neither the Acholi nor the Obote army would take responsibility for the killings.” As a former soldier with the UNLA, he was the enemy of the NRA rebels and fought long and hard battles to kill the NRM/A rebels of Gen. Museveni.
His observations are supported by that of Col. Kutesa, a former officer of the NRM/A. Kutesa writes that he fought the bloody battle of Kampomera against Lt.Col. Ochora; both former outfits were arrayed against the other. Kutesa calls Ochora a personal friend with whom he often shares memories of their concerted attempts to kill each other. He also speaks of fighting against Colonel Ogole of the UNLA at Kamboga, where many combatants perished.
Col. Kutesa writes vividly of death and destruction in the Luweero war. However, Museveni would rather not call these fighters to account for Luweero deaths; neither does he investigate or punish these officers for Luweero deaths. In the context of political demonization to retain power at all costs, the genocide against the Acholi people, politically opposed to the NRM/A regime, would continue under the propaganda machinery that extols Museveni as ushering in the era of “peace and tranquility,” “economic growth,” and the “golden boy of the west” and “the savior of Uganda from ruin.”
However, one thing remains clear to critical observers. Kevin Ogen Aliro, a journalist with The Monitor newspaper reports why some people are reluctant to see the genocide in Acholi (The Monitor, May 18, 1999):

I particularly understand the dilemma of some ordinary Ugandans, who after many years of torture and oppression, don’t want to believe that the UPDF (former NRM/A) …could even dream of such atrocities against any Ugandan… Ugandans are victims of self-denial and its associated symptoms. In their subconscious…they know that UPDF, like previous armies, are capable of all and worse.

Aliro gives a personal reminiscence:

I was like such Ugandans. There were times when I would never believe the UPDF would hurt a fly. I dismissed the Bur Coro incident (in which innocent human beings were buried and smoked in a pit) as an isolated case of indiscipline.

In his conclusion about the silence surrounding the genocide in Acholi, he said,

Deep inside, we (journalists) were also afraid. Afraid of the known consequences of publishing anything that may be deemed by the powers that be as “damaging to the image of Museveni’s sacred cow, the NRA (now the UPDF).” Hundreds of other incidents came and went, most unreported.

The decimation of the Acholi population is the result of lethal cocktail of deceit, demonization and ethno-xenophobic hate, in which western governments and the United Nations became complicit. Genocide is unfolding under our watch as we save Darfur, a less severe and shorter in intensity tragedy, than that in northern Uganda. There is ongoing genocide against the Acholi people, political opponents of the NRM/A regime, in northern Uganda.

[e] Luweero deaths as a necessary political tool for regime survival and governance.
The Luweero atrocities and mass deaths is being used to build a vanguard of people often unwilling to hear the narratives that challenge NRM/A political myths and call into question comfortable and self-righteous assumptions of the NRM/A regime’s non-complicity.
Badru Wegulo, Chairman of the UPC Constitutional Steering Committee, challenged Museveni to investigate the Luweero deaths. He observes that whenever election time nears, Luweero deaths are raised to prominence by Museveni. Skulls and other human bones are dug up; the staccato of machine gun fire and eerie torture cries play on the national radio to instigate ethno-xenophobic hatred and win votes for Museveni. Wegulo said (The Monitor, June 22, 2005),

If the government is concerned about Ugandans, we demand that an international commission be set up to investigate who is responsible for the killings in Luweero.

The NRM spokesman, Ofwono Opondo, answered,

There is no need for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and we shall not have one anyway.

Concerned and irked by the continuing exploitation of Luweero deaths for political blackmail by the NRM/A, a Member of Parliament for Samia Bugwe North, insisted:

We are tired of Luweero and the demonization…They have stretched us far enough…”

Ofwono Opondo, once again, dismissed the call for international investigation. He said,

We do not need the international community to come and tell us who killed people in Luweero either. The survivors are there and they can tell us who destroyed their homes.

Early this year, 2006, before ambassadors and high commissioners accredited to Uganda, a suggestion to have the alleged perpetrators tried for Luweero deaths and punished was dismissed by Museveni:

[We] did not follow up culprits who fled to European capitals from where they are issuing invectives on [my] government to paint it black. [It} was deliberate not to ask for extradition of presidents Idi Amin and Milton Obote to allow wounds to heal. The devils we chased away here ran to Europe from where they became angels. (New Vision, May 18, 2006).

If Museveni wanted to allow the Luweero wounds to heal, why is it that when the legitimacy of his regime to govern is slipping, then Luweero atrocities are remembered and the “wounds” opened? Certainly, the concealment of truth and perpetration of atrocities through [i] shifting the blame and [ii] using truth telling merely as tactical but not principled communication, yield handsome dividends to legitimize President Museveni’s governance.

3. THE CONCEALMENT OF TRUTH UNDER NRM/A REGIME OF GEN. YOWERI MUSEVENI:
[a] Shifting the blame

Joseph Paul Goebbels, Propaganda Minister of the Nazi regime under Adolph Hitler.

If you will tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.

It follows that the longer the genocide perpetrated by Museveni and associates in northern Uganda continues, the longer and larger are the lies told. Shifting the blame of Luweero mass death conceals the truth.
Recently, President Museveni alleged that Olara Otunnu, a former Uganda diplomat at the UN, a former Under-Secretary for Children in Armed Conflict at the UN, is responsible for the Luweero atrocities. Olara Otunnu, the author of various articles: “What Shall I tell the children of Northern Uganda” (2001); “The Secret Genocide” (2006); “Nation in Crisis” (2006); and “Genocide in Northern Uganda” (2006), sought in his writings to expose Museveni’s demonic agenda for the ongoing genocide in northern and eastern Uganda. How farcical is it to attempt to pin the Luweero deaths on Olara-Otunnu, who never set foot in Luweero? Needless to say, the exploitation of Luweero deaths is a powerful political weapon for Museveni’s regime survival and governance. For this weapon to be disarmed an international investigation must be launched and Museveni and associates benefiting from parleying deception must be brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and war crimes in Luweero, eastern and northern parts of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

[b] Concealing the truth: Why is President Museveni hiding the Justice Oder Commission report on Luweero deaths?
On coming to power, the NRM/A regime commissioned an investigation into human rights abuses from 1962 to 1986. The commission recommended that several commanders of the former NRM/A, now UPDF, and the defunct UNLA be punished for war crimes in Luweero. However, the lists of the military commanders to be punished were never released; and Museveni refused to grant public access to the commission’s report. We must ask:
· Where is the Justice Oder Commission report that investigated, reported and recommended that some former UNLA and some current UPDF officers be punished for crimes committed in Luweero? Why is Museveni hiding the Justice Oder Commission report?

Museveni followed the refusal to release the Justice Oder commission report with an injunction against those NRM/A high command officers for writing about their Luweero guerilla experience, while under his [Museveni] command. What is that injunction supposed to hide?
Certainly, the truth about the many massacres that underpin governance, diplomatic support and legitimacy for Museveni will be exposed. The exposure will undermine the use of human remains and body parts as tools of governance, legitimacy and demonization of regime critics and political opponents. It will expose the propaganda machine of the Museveni regime.

4. NRM/A DECEIT AND MANIPULATION: TRUTH TELLING AS TACTICS, NEVER AS PRINCIPLE!
Truth telling has been reduced to tactics of regime survival and harnessing ethnic legitimacy, which is masked as nationalism. Here are some test cases of political and military elite duplicity, which must be understood solely as animated by the desire to cling to power at all cost. Power for power’s sake is the maxim and it must be held by lies, deception and duplicity.

[a] Nairobi Peace Talks in 1985.
Museveni said,

We tried peacefully to push the case that the Amin elements, who had killed people in broad daylight, must be excluded.

The present truth is: Former notorious Amin’s ministers, Moses Ali, became a Minister under Museveni, and Amin’s Vice-President, Mustafa Adrisi, notorious for mass deaths, (and was jailed for mass murders), is now one of the over 100 advisors to President Yoweri Museveni.

[b] Soldiers on the street of Kampala
Museveni swore never to call soldiers to the streets (The Weekly Observer, 2005)
On his 6th day in Office in 1986, President Museveni swore:

I will never deploy soldiers on streets like my predecessors had done.

The present truth is: On December 22, 2005, John Vivian Sserwanio, a journalist, revisits the promise and reports in The Weekly Observer, 2005. He writes,

Soldiers are now a regular feature on Kampala Street.


[c] Constitutional Term Limit
Peter Mwesigye of The Crusader asked Museveni about the constitutional term limit.

Museveni said, in The Crusader, Sunday 12 May, 1996:

I said that I would serve only one term, this term. My inclination is that I should retire after this. Of course the constitution says I can serve two terms as president, and it would not be unconstitutional if I did it; but my inclination is that I should serve this one term, then retire.

President Museveni followed the statement by writing in the New Vision, on Oct 29-Nov 5, 2003, saying that,

I will not cling to power.

The present truth is: Museveni changed the Constitution to govern as a life president, in the Kisanja-project (no-term limit) (See, The Monitor, March 16, 2005, “Museveni Explains Reluctance to Retire”; New Vision, March 17, 2005, “I want to remain an Actor – Museveni”).

Museveni said,

Bidandi Ssali has been asking me to retire and remain an advisor. But if I advise you when I am Commander-in-Chief and President and you refused to take heed, how sure are you that you will take my advice when I am just an advising elder.

Emphasizing his desire to never relinquish power through electoral process, Museveni, in the New Vision newspaper, August 13, 2004, said,

Why should I sentence Ugandans to suicide by handing over power to people we fought and defeated?

[d] Electricity Power Crisis
Museveni said, on Independence Day celebration at Kololo on October 9, 2004,

Interference from development partners has made it impossible to hold anybody accountable for the power crisis, as the country had become “everybody’s business.

In an opinion piece to the New Vision, on February 15, 2006, President Museveni shifted the blame to FDC political opponents:

The opponents of this dam were PAFO members who, at that time, were masquerading as Movementists but have since then joined FDC. These were people like Kazoora, Muntu, Salaamu Musumba, etc.

The truth is: Jaberi Bidandi Ssali, former Minister of Energy and Local Government in the NRM/A, and Museveni’s confidant, said,

As far back as 1989, a proposal to build new hydro electric power sources to stabilize the country’s power supply for the next 15 years (1990-2005) was tabled but President Museveni rejected the idea. He [Museveni] said no, no, no, … clearly irritated” (The Observer, 2006)

Bidandi continued,

Museveni’s rejection partly stems from his nature of “thinking he has the solution to every problem, only for him to turn around later and blame other people whenever things go wrong.

Shifting the blame for electricity power shortage to FDC opposition party, Museveni writes (New Vision, February 15, 2006),

We must ask you to reject them in the coming elections. Many of them no longer belong to the Movement. They are in FDC. These are: Kazoora, Musumba, Muntu, Lukyamuzi etc” responsible for electricity shortage and paralyzing the Government in respect to electricity.

[e] On the Genocide in Northern Uganda
Museveni blamed donors for the failure to defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army in the wake of Barlonyo massacres.

The truth is: Ambassador Sigurd Illing, Head of European Union Delegation, disagrees.
Ambassador Illing, said,” (The Monitor, February 28, 2004, “Don’t Blame us for Kony’s war – Donors.”)

Donors agreed to exceptional increases in defense spending last year that were related to combating the LRA.

Ambassador Illing added,

It is the obligation of government, as Parliament repeated this week, to protect the lives and property of its people.

[f] On Multiparty and Democratic Pluralism in Uganda
Edmund Kizito of Reuters asked President Museveni,

We expect you campaigning against multiparty democracy?

Museveni answered:

Yes, Yes. I will campaign against multipartyism. I do not believe in multipartyism for Africa now or Uganda. For the next ten or fifteen years, I do not believe in it. So I will campaign against multipartyism in Uganda in four years time. And I am sure we shall defeat it. We shall not have multipartyism here (The Monitor Online, 2005; The East African, Nairobi, August 2, 2005).

The truth is: In 2005, Museveni campaigned for multipartyism after changing the constitution so that he becomes a life president (The Monitor, March 24, 2005, “Opposition Call for Anti-Kisanja Demo”).

[g] The ICC and Human Rights Violations in Northern and Eastern Uganda
Apolo Kakaire writes on July 6, 2006 under the title, “Amnesty Offer Blow for Rebel Chief Arrest Plans” (News: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, London, UK; The Monitor, May 17, 2007, “Museveni Offers Kony New Deal”)
Museveni said,

If Kony reaches a deal with me, Uganda would guarantee him safety from prosecution, by the ICC (International Criminal Court).

Museveni himself blamed his offer on the United Nations. He said,

The United Nation, by implication the ICC, has no moral authority to demand that Kony be brought to trial, since they had failed to arrest him…

The truth is: Museveni now insists that Kony be arrested by the ICC. Museveni said,

The ICC is actually very good for us (Uganda) because it makes the terrorists (rebels) come up to seek peace and end impunity. The ICC was created to fight impunity.

In dealing with Museveni, we must be clear that deceptions and propaganda, however openly contradicting, which will consolidate the NRM/A regime in power and shield him from prosecution for war crimes and genocide, are usually presented as truth. He preempts democratic political threats to his hold onto power by vicious blackmail, violence, deception and atrocities for which opponents must take the blame.

CONCLUSION
The manipulation of Luweero deaths has become a powerful political and military weapon in the hands of NRM/A political and military elite to mobilize ethno-xenophobic hate and chauvinistic nationalism against political opponents. Particularly against the Acholi population, it has been used to justify the ongoing genocide, and, among other political critics, it is useful to demonize to consolidate a militarist and ethno-xenophobic power base. Luweero deaths are useful for the preservation of NRM rule, as the NRM regime struggles to legitimize its governance and entrench itself in power. The use of Luweero deaths as weapons of malice, to malign opponents and retain power has replaced the search for justice. At the hand of Gen. Museveni, it has become an actual commodity, a promissory note and a currency to buy political support. The success of manipulating the Luweero deaths is reflected in incessant instability and denying access to the Justice Oder commission report that investigated human rights abuses from 1962 to 1985; denying a truth and reconciliation commission investigation; refusing an independent international inquiry into Luweero deaths and prohibiting retired NRM/A military officers from freely writing about their experiences in the Luweero war.
Ugandans must understand that Museveni used atrocities to get to power; uses atrocities to impede democratization that threatens his hold on power, by shifting the blame on his political opponents like the UPC and FDC. Museveni was successful in using atrocities against Obote in Luweero; against Besigye in the last two general elections; in the war against rebels in eastern and northern Uganda since 1986, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is also successful in maliciously shifting the blame for the war in northern Uganda upon western donor nations who contribute 52 percent of Uganda’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but who also allied with Museveni for strategic control of Africa.
Finally, the history of NRM/A regime is a narrative of victimization, violence, massacres, genocide and exploitation of death to give political life to the NRM/A regime. Mass deaths, deception and genocide disguised as concern for the sanctity and protection of life, are necessary for NRM/A legitimacy to govern. Sadly to say that the NRM/A regime was never about the promotion of democracy and human rights, but rather domination resting on coercion, massacres, beatings, mutilations, humiliations, rape and genocide. While this analysis does not offer insight into NRM/A psychopathological deception, lies and obsession with death and massacres, one point must remain clear: whatever direction our current debate takes us, it must go down the path of broader public education and learning the truth about Museveni’s complicity in the Luweero deaths and the horrendous destruction of lives in its wake. It must also emphasize the shameless duplicity with which Museveni has harnessed Luweero deaths for political dividends. What we understand today as Luweero deaths is a legacy of the NRM/A engineered war on February 6, 1981, against the defunct UNLA of the late Apolo Milton Obote, nearly 25 years ago. It is apt, to quote Joseph Paul Goebells honest boast, “We have made the Reich by propaganda” and I must paraphrase it to say that in Uganda, the NRM/A has made itself by propaganda.

Onek Adyanga (a PhD candidate in History, the University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA)

Forced Labor in Acoli (HURIFO EXAMINER Magazine ISSUE 1 2006)

Here are highlights from Human Right Focus on Forced Labor in Acoli (HURIFO EXAMINER Magazine ISSUE 1 2006, available at http://www.friendsf orpeaceinafrica. org/ under Downloads and Links).

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In the war affected Acholiland there is a phenomenon where the military along certain roads subject the civilians, mainly IDPs, using these roads to involuntary labour of slashing the sides of the road. …….

For IDPs on foot or using bicycles it has always been a must to participate in this kind of compulsory work, where no excuse seemed acceptable to the military. Until recently many people forced to work by the UPDF soldiers against their will, in what is called “forced labour” thought the soldiers were doing it for security reasons.

The forced labour referred to here, is the type where during rainy season the UPDF soldiers mount roadblocks along high ways. When the passengers come to pass such road blocks they are stopped and given a sizeable portions to slash while others could be made to fell down trees. The trees that are felled down are later burnt for charcoal, which is assumed to be sold. It is difficult to tell the owners of such charcoal. In situations where slashing tools, slashers, are limited some of the people are given sliced bamboo sticks to use. Often those who are unable to slash or fell trees for various reasons such as sickness or they are in a hurry for something, have to pay money, give gifts to the soldiers to buy their way through. If they cannot give anything they must work. Unfortunately for these civilians even after passing the first military roadblock where they were either forced to work or had to pay something for passage, they are not given a note or a voucher to show at the next roadblock, that they have already worked at the previous point. These same road-users are subjected to the same work or pay as at the previous roadblock.

In case of several roadblocks along a particular road, at which road-users are subjected to this treatment, makes travel more expensive and time consuming. ….It should be noted that the usual clearing of roadside by Ministry of Works is only about 3 metres from the road, but this roadside clearance could go over 30 metres from the road.

Article 28 subsection 2 (b) of The 1995 Uganda Constitution does allow for some kind of labour in conflict situations. ….On the 27/2/2006 soldiers at Lacekocot put up a road block where they stopped pedestrians and made people to clear roadside.

A passenger travelling on 28/2/2006 from Gulu to Kitgum, in vehicle registration No. UAG 076T, complained that they were stopped three times at Laguti, Ogom and Acholibur, and forced to clear the roadside using split bamboo sticks.

A cyclist travelling to Gulu from Lacekocot in late February asked the soldiers why they were forcing them to clear the roadside at this time of the year when the grass has just been burnt. He was told that civilians didn’t vote wisely so they anticipate war anytime. He says he finds it hard to understand what they mean but thinks that the soldiers are punishing civilians for voting against the movement government in the last election. This year 2006, unlike previous years, forced labour has started this time very early, before the dry season was over. ……“Should you opt to slash instead of paying, the soldiers would enlarge your portion till you come to realise that they are interested in your money and not your labour, therefore, you pay them” a trader narrated. This has become an extortion business. …… HURIFO, through its Lawyers Donge and Company Advocate [has] filed a “public interest litigation case against the Attorney General” seeking from the High Court compensation to the victims as well as deterrent to the perpetrators. ….

The HURIFO public interest litigation case before the courts of law has not yet yielded in a court pronouncement on this forced labour. Hence, forced labour has still continued in different parts of Acholi subregion particularly Gulu and Pader districts. In Omoro County, along Kampala road at Opaka forest, it is on record that a woman delivered at the roadside because the soldiers couldn’t allow the husband to rush her to the hospital before completing slashing the portion he was given to slash.

The road section Lakwatomer to Koro Abili, along Gulu-Moroto road especially at Atede, Labora, Lakwatomer, and Adak Group Farm, are spots for forced labour while Corner Ojar to Acet some passengers reported that some soldiers ask for cash or sachets of liquor, Chief Waragi. These payments have been termed “airtime” and now driver carry this liquor along to enable them not be made to slash. ….Similarly in Aswa areas of coo-pe to Lukome, Unyama forest to Awach, Awach to Paicho, and Kilak Alokolum, Alero through to Anaka, Awer to Pagak and Awer to Pabo all these reported forced labour in the year 2005. Awer-Pabo stretch reported one case in which an LC official connived with the soldiers to extort money from a business man under the guise of forced labour.

Pader district has been relatively more affected with human rights violations than Gulu probably because of the absence of human rights organisations. However the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) in response set up an office there in the last quarter of 2005. Hot spots from where HURIFO received reports of forced labour in Pader district in 2005 were along roads to Kitgum matidi, Patongo, Kalongo, and Adilang. This year the worst area experiencing forced labour in Pader district appears to be along the Gulu-Kitgum road, the stretch between river Aswa bridge and Acholibur. These are areas of Angagura, Ogom, Lacekocot, Atanga, Laguti, and Acholibur. Here roadside clearing is not only done during rainy seasons as in other parts but even in dry season when grasses are burnt down. ……

At one point there were up to 14 roadblocks along this stretch, prompting a journalist to write a story about the practice in the Rupiny weekly Newspaper of 5th April 2006. [One] victim narrated how one of the commanders put the muzzle of a gun at his chest and threaten him saying “We can kill and know what to say”. ………. “Those who can neither slash nor give money for any reasons are usually beaten and warned not to travel on Movement party’s roads because they did not vote for it; and should rather wait to use FDC roads” commented one victim.

NB: In case you are not aware, there is a petition to stop the Northern Uganda Genocide at: http://www.petition online.com/ savacoli/ petition. html __._,_.___

DERAILING PROGRESS OF THE PEACE PROCESS (James Opoka 2001)

DERAILING PROGRESS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/FedsNet/message/1023

To avoid exposing his real objectives, Museveni concocted a peace plan he knew would never be acceptable to the citizens in the north. The Betty Bigombe Peace talks. On realising that the peace process was yielding fruit, Museveni opted to destroy the process and issued an ultimatum. The negotiation collapsed immediately there was an immediate resumption to hostilities.

We all know Museveni never lives up to any negotiations – evident since the UNLA– NRA Nairobi peace talks. Other examples include the negotiations between the NRA and Brig Moses Ali’s group during the struggle. They reached an agreement that after the struggle Moses Ali would be made Vice President and promoted to the rank of Major General, that his senior officers will be appointed to senior positions in the Army and government. To date Moses Ali is not VP, he only illegally promoted himself to the rank of General. His other comrades are in the cold and have become destitute.

Another example is the Kikunyu conference of 1982 where there was an agreement that when the bush struggles ends Buganda would acquire a federal status. Since the bush war ended in 1986 we know what has happened. Those who took the lead in reminding Museveni were labelled rebels and arrested e.g. Vincent Kyobe; Others like Dr. Martin Kato are in exile. We cannot forget the War victims of Luwero and Arua who were promised resettlement packages and rehabilitation packages. If he is to be taken for his word or action, Ugandans are aware of what he did with the 10-point programme –placed it in a gun barrel. The above is meant to explain that Museveni never means any negotiations he goes to. Citizens in the north continued to perish in the never-ending conflict because of these methods.

Museveni later introduced the Internally Displaced Peoples Camp. A Nazi-type policy, very typical of Adolf Hitler and Sloban Milosovic’s sectarian extermination. The people opposed the establishment of these camps and were forcefully evicted from their homes. The UPDF bombed the villages killing several people, burning down huts and granaries. They also posed as rebels cutting peoples ears and lips to create fear among the locals and force them to accepting the camps. To date the people in the camps are still struggling to go back to their homes. There was no preparation for the primary social services in these camps. Ugandan citizens were subjected to living like refugees in their own country. This is the most disastrous human catastrophe in the history of Uganda. The human death toll is overwhelming. ...

James Opoka Sept., 2001

STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN ACHOLI GENOCIDE, NORTHERN UGANDA. (Onek Adyanga)

STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN ACHOLI GENOCIDE, NORTHERN UGANDA.

Introduction

Genocide as political program and military policy does not occur by inadvertence but by deliberately orchestrated actions resulting in the destruction of a targeted group. To conceal it, modern genocide perpetrators have intentionally harnessed a synergy of debilitating factors such as infectious diseases, starvation and enforced hopelessness to execute the extermination policy. The high mortality caused by such debilities would have otherwise been benign if the targeted population was not entrapped in an environment where mass death could expeditiously occur. In the Acholi genocide debate, Olara Otunnu, a former United Nation’s Under-Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict, argues that the Government of Uganda has knowingly created an environment where mass murder of the Acholi population would occur. But General David Tinyefunza of Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF), formerly, the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A), and presidential advisor on security disagrees. He argues that the UPDF is providing security in “protected villages” and the mass murders are because of war. But war usually allows a regime to hide the implementation of mass murder from the international community and media and the gullible domestic population. It also enables a regime to shift blame for mass murder on the other combatant army, and at times, on the victims for their extermination. Most important of all, war allows the spreading of xenophobia and homicidal hate, necessary ingredients for the extermination of a targeted group.

I will examine the politics and the strategy of the war between General Museveni’s UPDF and General Kony’s Lord Resistance Army (LRA) to unravel the contours of Acholi genocide. Did the civil war offer the excuse and the occasion to execute the final solution against the Acholi population? What ideology and justifications have precipitated the destruction of the Acholi population? What roles have state institutions played in perpetrating the mass deaths of the Acholi population? How has the military policy of “protection” harnessed the debilitating synergies to exterminate the Acholi population? Against this background, I will test the hypothesis of advertence through harnessing a synergy of debilities in comparison with that of offering security in “protected villages.” The aim is to show how the confluence of factors that have synergistically caused mass deaths of the Acholi population came into being and what arguments have been used to sustain it. In the foregoing analysis, I will examine the nature of the state that can commit genocide against its own population. In the second, I will examine the role of the mass media in the genocide against the Acholi population. In the third, I will analyze the military strategy pursued by the UPDF and the LRA; and, the response of the media. In the fourth, I will examine the response of the international community. Finally, an attempt will be made to uncover the political and military policy that have concealed and deliberately harnessed mortal synergies of genocide against the Acholi population.

1. CREATING A GENOCIDE STATE: NRM/A REGIME AND GENOCIDE

The account of genocide that ignores the role of the state in the destruction of a target group is incomplete. In Uganda, the state took the form of a one-party dictatorship known as “the Movement System.” Every Ugandan citizen, young and old, was forced by law to become a member. It followed that all military and local level leaders were chosen from among the Movement Cadres, who graduated from Kyankwanzi Political School, a college where “virulent xenophobia and racism” according to one graduate cadre, “was officially taught.” The Movement System was so ubiquitous that the NRM/A regime was truly a totalitarian state. Here, General Museveni could pursue a life presidency project, uncontested. Democracy, which could provide for a peaceful contest for leadership, was demonized as sectarian, divisive, backward and anti-human. Sorrowfully enough, western donor governments promoted and financed the one-party totalitarian state, which was in contradiction with what they have promoted around the world as necessary for good governance, respect for human rights and equitable development.

With western governments’ complicity, the NRM/A regime used the mass media to scapegoat the Acholi population for the deaths in Luwero, a district where General Museveni fought the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) of the late President Milton Obote. We must be clear that the Acholi population never fought any community in Uganda and never had an army or a militia group of their own during Obote’s regime. However, Museveni needed to scapegoat the Acholi people, as a group, in order to consolidate an ethno-nationalist power base and intimidate any opposition through a militarist policy.

2. THE NRA REGIME AND THE MASS MEDIA
The NRM/A mass media was the ultimate tool of political mobilization of sections of the domestic audience and western governments whose cooperation or at least acquiescence was necessary for the perpetration of genocide. It forced every significant organ of information and opinion to chorus the same litany of disinformation, demonization and homicidal xenophobia against the Acholi population in the following ways:

[a] Demonization and Incitement to mass murder
The Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC), former Radio Uganda, developed a very eerie linguistic formulation of negative emotion that inspired hatred for the Acholi population. It played xenophobic songs interspersed with vilification and offensive announcement of “Abanyanya” (meaning non-citizens, in fact, it refers to southern Sudanese) to urge a bloody revenge. Provocative songs like, “moto nawaka, mama eh!, moto nawaka….” translated as, “fire is burning Mother, eh! Fire is burning… when we reach Soroti, we will bomb, when we reach Lira, we will bomb, but when we reach Kitgum and Gulu, we will bomb and desolate completely.”

Following the song with wild and fictitious accusation that the Acholi population killed people in Luwero, it stirred negative emotion by rattling human bones amidst scary torture cry and staccato of machinegun fire to provoke a homicidal revenge against the Acholi population. As a result many Acholi’s were lynched on the streets of Kampala with vehicle tires slung around their necks and ignited, thus, popping out the victims eyes and cooking their brains. The media campaign to forge and consolidate such ethno-xenophobia and homicidal hatred is without precedent in post-independence Uganda.
[b] Justifying ethno-xenophobic racism and homicidal exterminations
The language of extermination, elimination, massacres and butchering proliferated in the media as the description of war policy against the Acholi people. On many occasions, the NRM/A regime used [a] a language of demagogy and headlong irrationality like “those killers who lost power are fighting to return to finish the job and we must preempt them.” [b] It posed rhetorical questions and exclamations such as “if the Acholi population did not kill in Luwero, who did it, eh!” [c] It issued menacing ultimatums based on a sense of infinite self-righteousness like “any opposition to us will meet with uncompromising annihilation.” [d] It made immense accusations backed by no evidence or investigations such as “all the Acholi people are killers” and [e] resorted to conspiracy-mongering and homicidal paranoia like “when we finish with the enemies, they will never rise-up as a community of people.” These powerful and brazen incitements to massacres through a language of genocide before genocide was even conceivable had immense negative effect of creating homicidal hate and indifference following the commencement of mass murders of the Acholi people. The NRM/A regime’s fictive arguments only make sense when the political and military elite chose genocide as a political strategy to retain power.

The provocation to homicidal extermination radicalized many NRM/A soldiers and auxiliary militia forces to a state of extreme paranoia and xenophobic hate. One senior NRM/A military officer observed, “we really hated the Acholi people and wanted to exterminate them. Our favoured slogan was ‘kill the Acholi, kill more Acholi, kill all the Acholi people…’ We vowed that by the end of the war, Acholi language would only be spoken in hell.”

The instigation of homicidal hate made it a relatively simple matter for the NRM/A political commissar, Commander Karusoke Kajabago, to remark that those who oppose the NRM/A (meaning the Acholi population) are biological substances to be exterminated. Regrettably, no protest to President Museveni was ever lodged by human rights and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), western donor governments and Uganda citizens for a declaration of intention to commit genocide.

3. THE NORTHERN UGANDA CIVIL WAR
It was possible for the UPDF in alliance with militia groups against the LRA to have fought an aggressive war in a just manner. This would have involved following the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the protection of non-combatants, proportionality in the application of lethal force, proper treatment of POWs and observance of customary and positive rules of engagement.

In the war against the LRA, the UPDF would execute attacks on vital communication links, arrest of collaborators and safeguard of civilian institutions and means of livelihood. And the LRA would target the UPDF military installations with clear rules of engagement, arrest partisans and protect the civilian population. But what were the conducts of warfare of the LRA and the UPDF in the northern Uganda civil war?

THE LRA INSURGENCY STRATEGY
Along a military strategy similar to that of Museveni’s NRM/A bush war in the 1980s against the late President Obote, the LRA military policy included the following strategies:
[i] Forced abduction of children to be trained as soldiers: These children were very cruelly indoctrinated into the art of warfare. Female child soldiers suffered the most. They were forcibly raped and kept as concubines and sexual slaves for the commanders. The LRA atrocities are documented in Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and numerous newspaper reports. These atrocities are similar to that of Museveni from a firsthand account by a former NRM/A child soldier, China Keitetsi. In her book, Child Soldier: Fighting for My Life, she documents similar acts of brutality and sexual enslavement of abducted children and girls. In this regard, both Museveni and Kony’s military recruitment strategies are similar.
The logic of relying on child abduction for waging war between Kony and Museveni was equally similar. A surrendered senior LRA military commander confessed to his elders, “we were abducting children because we needed to keep fighting to survive since mature adults have refused to voluntarily enlist.” This logic is similar to that of Museveni’s NRM/A. Museveni defended the forced abduction of child soldiers in a BBC interview as necessary for the war, rhetorically asking, “What is this Geneva Convention you are talking about? I have never read it.” and continued to defend it: “In our culture, children are trained to fight. It is normal.”
[ii] Demonstrative atrocities and destruction aimed at terrorizing non-combatant population into submission and non-cooperation with the others’ enemy combatant forces. A former sergeant in the NRM/A observes that they use to execute or bind victims “kandoya” style (a very painful and debilitating form of punishment that often resulted in paralysis of victims hands). He emphasized that the goal was to deter cooperation with the defunct UNLA of the late Obote.

This is also similar to the LRA maiming of civilian population. A surrendered LRA soldier confessed: “we prohibited bicycling and maimed individuals believed to be collaborators with the UPDF. An Individual riding bicycle toward urban centers where the UPDF is located would quickly report our presence in villages, when we came to forcibly collect food. So we stopped bicycling when we are in the villages.”
As a security measure, the criminal logic of the NRM/A and the LRA atrocities are similar. Both leaders of the combatant groups, Museveni and Kony, must be indicted for committing crime against humanity.

[iii] Targeting civilian vehicles. The LRA have targeted civilian vehicles and killed scores of civilians. This is similar to NRM/A targeting civilian vehicles on Kampala-Gulu road and killing scores of civilians as well. In attacking civilians, both Kony and Museveni employed similar tactics, committing crimes against humanity.
With such a background, we need to assess the UPDF counter-insurgency strategy against the LRA in Acholiland. We must bear in mind that Museveni and the NRM/A regime vilified, demonized and made the Acholi people scapegoat for the deaths in Luwero. What influence has the demonization and scapegoat on the counter-insurgency policy?

THE UPDF COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY
[a] The Tactics
Despite strength in weaponry and assistance by western donor military advisors, the UPDF adopted a counter-insurgency policy involving de-legitimating tactics.
[i] The de-legitimating tactics: In some respect, the de-legitimating tactics perpetrated atrocities committed by the LRA insurgents in order to deny support, if any, the insurgents enjoyed in the community. The media extensively illuminated and credited the atrocities solely to the insurgents, while concealing UPDF complicity and in a perverted manner, praising their gallantry as liberators. However, the success of the UPDF de-legitimating strategies was short-lived, as local militia units consistently caught them committing atrocities.
[ii] The perpetration of demonstrative atrocities and destruction against civilian targets: The UPDF would masquerade as the LRA and promote gross atrocities only to return and pretend to be saviors. Some testimonies from victims exposed such strategies: a 30-year-old woman victim confirmed that she was maimed by the UPDF; and, the defunct Shariat newspaper reported in the 1990s that the UPDF soldiers were caught masquerading as the LRA rebels and planting landmines to blow up civilian vehicles.

The effectiveness of the militia units against the disguised UPDF soldiers embarrassed the government. But the guilty UPDF soldiers were promptly transferred to other mobile units to continue perpetrating more atrocities against civilians. A UPDF officer based in Gulu pointed out “that these atrocities are approved by higher headquarters and committed under clear operation mission orders.” And in cases where the guilty UPDF soldiers told the truth, the UPDF Military Court Martial (MCM), to silence and conceal complicity, expeditiously and summarily executed them. The Military Court Martial has become a legal weapon of war against truth and human rights violations. It is part and partial of the counter-insurgency policy concealing the perpetration of genocide.

[ii] The UPDF abductions and atrocities: Masquerading as the LRA, the UPDF burned down Radio Wa in Lira and abducted civilians. When a stage-managed rescue was conducted, the abductees testified that they were abducted by the UPDF. This prompted a Lango Member of Parliament to issue a press release that the “UPDF burnt Radio Wa and abducted civilians.” The terrorizing of the Langi, a community of the late President Obote, was meant to isolate and contain the LRA within the Acholi sub-region.
As the local militia units were quickly uncovering these strategies of mass deception, an ingenious strategy was developed by the UPDF elite and military advisors to entrap the Acholi population in concentration camps, under the ruses of protection.

[b] The UPDF tactics of creating the concentration camps
One of the common features of genocide is the concentration camp. The tactics of evacuating the Acholi population into concentration camps by the UPDF, ostensibly to “protect” them, was sheer terror and genocidal campaign. The strategies, which can be described as state terrorism against the Acholi population, attacked the family units, means of survival and livelihood and social infrastructures. This scorched-earth policy included the followings:
[i] Siege and artillery bombardment of villages: The UPDF siege and indiscriminately bombed villages with little, if any, regard for civilians. The attacks were aimed at terrorizing the civilian population, thereby inducing them to flee into concentration camps. The Monitor newspaper reports that after the expiration of a 48 hours dateline, heavy artillery bombardments commenced against civilians.
[ii] Intermittent or sporadic artillery bombardment: The aim is to cause civilians to falsely believe that they are safe and when the civilian populations commence mass exodus, expose them to more artillery bombardments. The tactics of siege and intermittent bombardments caused a very large, though incalculable proportion of the total dead Acholi civilians moving into the concentration camps.
A victim sobbed, “we thought we were temporary safe in our hiding place but during the lull in bombardment we got out of our hiding place to run for safety; the bombardments started killing my pregnant wife and two years old daughter who could not run.” The false sense of security to lure unsuspecting civilians into open ground for bombardment caused appalling massacres of women, children, young and old people, who were daily shredded to pieces by shrapnel debris scattered by motor shells deliberately lobbed among exposed fleeing civilian columns.
[iii] Strafing with helicopter gunship: The nature of the shelling, strafing with gun ships destroyed schools, hospitals and dispensaries and water wells. This scorched earth policy is a genocidal campaign. An Acholi Member of Parliament remarks to the New Vision newspaper: “we spoke with President Museveni about moving Acholi civilian population in a planned manner to camps. The President said that he would look into the matter. To our dismay, the next day, helicopter gunship came and started strafing villages killing scores of unarmed civilians.”
[iv] Deploying UPDF mobile military patrols into villages: Following the bombardments and gunship strafing, UPDF mobile infantry units went into villages to destroy homes of those too frightened to move and to force them to abandon their homes. Water wells were poisoned, food granaries were burned or looted and those grievously injured or too weak to move were summarily shot. A victim cried, “we were herded like animals. We were not considered human beings; only the UPDF felt they were human beings. They killed our family members and got rid of them like animals.” A UPDF patrol leader agrees, “The mission order from my superiors was to “omuhiigo ebikoko” (translated from Runyankole to mean, “to go hunting animals”). He emphasized, “the ‘ebikoko’ (meaning animal) obeys order or gets shot.”
This scorched-earth policy threatened Acholi survival in fundamental ways because families were separated by death due to thirst, exhaustion, physical abuse and execution by the UPDF. The traumatic evacuation process destroyed the Acholi social, cultural and economic support system, which is fundamental to their survival. It is what Jan Egeland, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) accurately described during his visits to the concentration camps on April 4 2006, as the “worse form of terrorism in the world.” He emphasized that “nowhere in the world have large areas where between 80 and 90 percent of the population have been terrorized into camps by violence.” Once again, General Museveni opposed Egeland’s comprehensive approach to the concentration camps, including a Special UN envoy for northern Uganda. This means that the genocide project against the Acholi people will continue unabated.

[c] The UPDF administration of the concentration camps
The concentration camps administration strategy is a total war against the Acholi society because of the following strategies:
[i] Proliferation of sodomy: The HIV/AIDS infected UPDF soldiers sodomize families with the view to infecting them with the disease and also humiliating them. The Gersony report points out that the UPDF battalion based in Gulu was nicknamed by the population “langungu-gungu” (meaning to sodomize). Sodomizing the Acholi population became part of the UPDF rite of passage, where a soldier was not considered a true man and was mocked to “go home and rear children” if he does not sodomize the Acholi concentration camp residents. The UPDF sodomy patrols armed with assault rifles and HIV/AIDS roam the camps at night stoking for families. A UPDF officer explains how difficult it was to resist the temptation of joining the mobile sodomy patrol units.
He said, “when UPDF soldiers sodomize the Acholi population, they would return to barracks shouting, ‘we are real men, we are real men, we have been into camps on patrol and sodomized the Acholi people. We are men, real men, now!’
Hardcore UPDF warriordom respect was won by severally sodomizing the same household members. A UPDF Captain boasted, “the soldiers have no taste for moral rectitude because renown and manhood is easier won in moral debauchery and depravities. These young warriors are eager to earn a badge of manhood and hardcore warriorhood against the Acholi population. This is war.” To the extent that the UPDF soldiers see themselves as earning a badge of honor and warriordom respect, they do not impute criminality to it. But we must impute the genocide intention to the UPDF political and military elite who planned, concealed and promoted the concentration camps as sexual commons.
Thus, sodomy was not simply an aberrant behaviour that the UPDF HIV/AIDS infected soldiers engaged in, it is an official policy that served to define rite of passage, manhood and warriordom respect to the UPDF officers and men.
[ii] Enforced Starvation: crops that concentration camp residents planted have been destroyed on the excuse of providing food to rebels. Many women who risked going out to forage for food for their starving and malnourished children were shot and killed by the UPDF soldiers.
[iii] Rejecting and Frustrating Humanitarian Assistance that can ameliorate mass deaths. General Museveni’s Cabinet Ministers refused any international humanitarian assistance to ameliorate the dire humanitarian situations. This has turned the concentration camps into infamous sites of mass murders. The World Health Organization (WHO) and NGOs reports document over 1,000 people die every week, that is, over 50,000 deaths per year. The mortality rate is three times that of Darfur in the Sudan. The violent death rate, according to Oxfam and Uganda civil society groups, is 146 deaths per day and this is several times higher than that of Iraq, a country actively at war with the United States of America. Yet, in a discussion with Jan Egeland, the United Nations Under-Secretary General for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) on April 4, 2006, General Museveni dismisses the daily death figures, of over 146 per day or 1,000 per week, as not worth highlighting. General Museveni also opposed the suggestion of a UN intervention force to provide humanitarian assistance and security to the Acholi genocide victims arguing that there is enough security in the concentration camps. We must be clear that the policy of rejecting humanitarian assistance by General Museveni and associates is a ploy to continue perpetrating mass murder in the concentration camps. This policy must be exposed for what it is, - a genocide policy.

[d] The response of the media: complicity and concealment of genocide.
In the uncritical and non-investigative reporting of numerous attacks, there was prevalence of ambiguous and deceptive phrases, which actively promoted and concealed genocide. Some of the mischaracterization of war against civilians included the followings:
[i] Use of ambiguous and deceptive phrases:
[a] War against non-combatant civilian Acholi population was reported as “pacifying the north”
[b] Murderous artillery bombardments and helicopter strafing as “moving people into camps for their protection”
[c] Poisoning civilian water wells as “denying the rebels drinking water”
[d] Emphasizing vacillating perspectives on the attacks on unarmed civilian Acholi population. At times, it reported it as a war against the LRA, or against the Sudan, or against terrorists instead of the Acholi population being attacked by the UPDF.
[e] Killing abducted children as “killing rebels”; when the abducted children escape from LRA captivity, they are reported as “rescued abductees.”
[ii] Misrepresenting the frame of reference in the war
Occasional accurate reporting of civilian bombardments is interspersed with blaming the LRA as responsible for the creating the camps. This is then followed with a more focused rendition of alleged LRA rule by 10 commandments and other alleged lurid and perverted details of vile atrocities, suggesting that the UPDF atrocities against the Acholi people are less severe, and therefore, acceptable.
On the many occasions when Museveni scuttled the almost successful peace negotiation between Betty Bigombe, a government appointed peace negotiator with the LRA peace team, the media often misreported that the LRA are disinterested in peace talks. They would then make a case for war, which is the cover for the genocide against the Acholi population.

5. THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO THE PLEA OF ACHOLI GENOCIDE VICTIMS: CHIDED AND INDIFFERENCE!
The international community have chided and reacted with indifference to the plea of Acholi people for a genuine and unconditional negotiated peace.

The Acholi population based their plea on precedents from the International Community’s resolution of conflicts in Mozambique, where RENAMO committed serious atrocities against the civilian population; Sierra Leone, where Foday Sanko’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) committed unspeakable atrocities against the Sierra Leonean people and South Africa, where the apartheid regime committed horrible crimes against humanity. For the sake of peace, civil co-existence and continuation of a sense of nationhood, a genuine unconditional negotiated peace and amnesty was enforced.

The international community, against the background of other cases in Africa, points out that there must be no wanton impunity to perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide. Nonetheless, they are silent on numerous documented crimes of genocide being committed by the UPDF in the concentration camps. They have also refused to label the “worse and most forgotten humanitarian catastrophe in the world” festering under the “worse form of terrorism” as described by Jan Egeland, genocide.

To salvage the surviving genocide victim population, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), a non-partisan ecumenical coalition of the religious faiths, traveled to the capitals of western countries seeking a peaceful resolution to the war but their efforts have been ignored. Instead, the international community has joined factions of the genocide forces by training and equipping the UPDF in lethal war-fighting tactics, thus, continuing the perpetration of genocide against the Acholi population.

The indifference shown by the international community by throttling fast-forward with militarism, equipping and training the UPDF, providing psychological warfare expertise for concealing and perpetrating genocide against the Acholi population is unparallel in the twenty first century. It is mockery of the international community’s dictum of “NEVER AGAIN,” will genocide occur under our watch. For this dictum to garner hope for our collective humanity, it must be openly and dispassionately enforced.

CONCLUSION
When we evaluate General Museveni’s sustain media campaign of ethno-xenophobia and official racism jointly with the UPDF war strategies, we must characterized the trajectory of the NRM/A regime as a genocide revolution, with the complicity of western donor governments and the United Nations.

The regime of General Museveni intentionally provided the structure and agency for genocide. It constructed and sustained it by [a] creating a genocide state, [b] demonizing the Acholi, as a people, [c] infusing the UPDF with ethno-xenophobic hate, [d] deploying artillery bombardments and helicopter gunship strafing to terrorize and forcibly induce exodus of civilian population into concentration camps, [e] encouraging rape by HIV/AIDS infected soldiers, [f] enforcing starvation [g] and entrapping the population in unsanitary and disease ridden concentration camp environments where the synergy of deadly agencies bring about genocide. While the LRA war strategy of child abduction, enforced sexual liaison with commanders and concubinage, which is similar to the NRM/A strategies against the southern/western Uganda population in the 1980s, is crime against humanity.

With a combination of such negative and deadly synergies intentionally imposed upon the Acholi population by General Museveni and associates, it would not be farfetched to accurately say, according to an NGO relief worker in Acholiland, that the “Acholi, as a people, face extinction” unless a stinging indictment of regional and global political alliances that routinely put ideological and strategic agendas before international law, moral accountability and plight of the victims is exposed and shamed.

Most important of all, the United Nations unanimous endorsement of the “responsibility to protect” during the World Summit in 2005 will remain hollow and sham. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, made the commitment very clear: "For the first time at this Summit we agree that states do not have the right to do what they will within their own borders, but that we, in the name of humanity, have a common duty to protect people where their own government will not." The genocide by General Museveni and associates against the Acholi people provides a test case of the UN commitment to protect in the name of humanity. The United Nations must without delay exercise the common duty to protect in the name of humanity, the Acholi people from the ongoing genocide now!

Rate of death in northern Uganda is three times higher than Iraq: Oxfam Press Release

Oxfam Press Release – 30 March 2006http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060330_nuganda

Rate of death in northern Uganda is three times higher than Iraq

The current rate of death from the war in northern Uganda is three times higher than in Iraq following the Allied invasion, finds a new report released today. The release of the report comes as the UN Under-Secretary General Jan Egeland holds high-level meetings in Kampala with the Ugandan government and other international representatives to address the 20-year conflict in northern Uganda.

The report by a coalition of over 50 leading non-governmental organizations, Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU), reveals new facts and figures showing the brutal impact of the conflict on the civilian population between the Government of Uganda and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army. The coalition includes Oxfam International, Care International, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, and International Rescue Committee as well as national and community based organizations.

Almost two million people have been displaced by the conflict. A staggering 25,000 children have been abducted during 20 years of war. One quarter of children in northern Uganda over ten years old have lost one or both parents.

The National Program Coordinator, Uganda Child Rights NGO Network and Chairperson of CSOPNU, Stella Ayo-Odongo said: "Northern Uganda is one of the world's worst war zones. The violent death rate in northern Uganda is three times higher than in Iraq. It is tragedy of the worst proportions. This conflict cannot be allowed to fester any longer. A peaceful resolution of this conflict must be found."

The report, "Counting the Cost: 20 years of war in northern Uganda" shows the devastating economic cost of the war estimated at US$1.7 billion (GBP £1bn) over the course of the last two decades. This is equivalent to the USA's total aid to Uganda between 1994 and 2002 and is the double the UK's average annual bilateral gross public expenditure on aid to Uganda from 1994 to 2001. The average annual cost of the war to Uganda is US$85 million.

Kathy Relleen, Oxfam's Policy Advisor in Uganda, said that twenty years was enough: "The Ugandan Government, the rebel army and the international community must fully acknowledge the true scale and horror of the situation in northern Uganda," said Relleen. "Twenty years of brutal violence is a scar on the world's conscience. The government of Uganda must act resolutely and without delay, both to guarantee the effective protection of civilians and to work with all sides to secure a just and lasting peace."

Kevin Fitzcharles, Director, Care International said: "UN Under-Secretary General Egeland is clearly pushing the Security Council to act, yet none of his recommendations are being implemented. It is time for the Security Council to recognize that its failure to address this crisis is a scar on its record and undermines its credibility. The UN must act by passing a resolution urging the Government of Uganda to protect its own people."

CSOPNU is calling upon all parties involved to take up Jan Egeland's challenge and to act decisively. The coalition is urging the UN Security Council to adopt Egeland's recommendation to appoint a panel of experts to investigate the activities of the LRA. The appointment of a high level envoy to reinvigorate peace efforts, address all aspects of the crisis and report back to the UN Security Council on progress has also receivedwidespread support though as yet no action has been taken.

Despite the scale of the crisis and its huge impact on the region, the Secretary General has not yet been publicly engaged. A recent meeting in Geneva offered hope for a comprehensive plan of action on the conflict but urgent action to make this plan a reality is needed. Benchmarks must be established to enable the Government of Uganda to show clear progress in monitoring peace, protecting the civilian population, and addressing the humanitarian crisis. Egeland's visit to Uganda raises hope for concrete action to address this devastating crisis.

Key figures from "Counting the Cost: 20 years of war in northern Uganda":

Rates of violent death in northern Uganda are three times higher than those reported in Iraq following the Allied Invasion in 2003. (The violent death rate for northern Uganda is currently at 146 deaths per week, (0.17 violent deaths per 10,000 people per day). This is three times higher than in Iraq, where the incidence of violent death in the period following the allied invasion was estimated to be 0.052 per 10,000 people per day.

20 years of conflict have had a devastating impact on children.

- 25,000 children have been abducted during the course of the war.
- 41 per cent of all deaths in the camps are amongst children under 5.
- 250,000 children in northern Uganda receive no education, despite Uganda's policy of universal primary education.
- An estimated 1,000 children have been born in LRA captivity to girls abducted by the rebel army.
- At the times of heightened insecurity up to 45,000 children "night commute" each evening and sleep in streets or makeshift shelters in town centers to avoid being abducted by the rebel Lord's Resistance Army. The World Food Program (WFP) currently delivers food to 84% of all households that are dependent on food aid. Almost 50 per cent of children are stunted due to malnutrition in the Kitgum area.

The economic cost of the war to Uganda after 20 years is $1.7 billion (£1bn). This is the equivalent of: Double the UK's gross bilateral public expenditure on aid to Uganda between 1994 and 2001 OR the USA's total aid to Uganda between 1994 and 2002.

The annual cost of the war to Uganda is $85 million. This is the equivalent of:

- The cost of providing clean, safe drinking water to 3.5 million people per year, or the total population of Liberia
- Uganda's total annual income from coffee exports
- The entire budget of the World Bank's five-year Northern Uganda Social Action Fund

Contact

For more information or to arrange an interview with a spokesperson, please contact:CSOPNU: Stella Ayo Odongo +256 772 467 427CARE International: Kevin Fitzcharles +256 782 910 814Oxfam International: Caroline Green +1 202 321 7858 or Clare Rudebeck + 44 (0) 7769 887 139

Notes to Editors

The report draws on statistics gathered during the last year. In the last three to four months northern Uganda has experienced more calm yet with the rains now fully upon us, the usual fear of increased rebel activity and violence is returning.

The report describes northern Uganda as a catastrophe fuelled by terrible acts of war and violence and by a shameful litany of failure – the continuing failure of the LRA to cease its brutal campaign of violence against civilians, and the failure of both the Government of Uganda and the international community to uphold their legal obligations to secure the protection, security, and peace of the civilians of northern Uganda. It recommends that:·

- The LRA must immediately cease attacks on, and abductions of, civilians and aid workers and show clear commitment to peace.·

- The Government of Uganda must take make the protection of civilians its first priority and take immediate, concrete action to guarantee the protection of its citizens and also commit to resolving this conflict peacefully·

- The UN Security Council must act resolutely and without delay to guarantee the protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance in northern Uganda.

FORMER U.N. UNDER-SECRETARY GENERALCALLS SITUATION IN NORTHERN UGANDA ‘GENOCIDE;’URGES SUPPORT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF U.N. RESOLUTION 1612AIMED AT PROTECT

FORMER U.N. UNDER-SECRETARY GENERALCALLS SITUATION IN NORTHERN UGANDA ‘GENOCIDE;’URGES SUPPORT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF U.N. RESOLUTION 1612AIMED AT PROTECTING CHILDREN DURING ARMED CONFLICT

BRONX, NY — A former U.N. Under-Secretary General and Uganda Foreign Minister has called the ongoing violence in northern Uganda “genocide” and said the situation there was far worse than the one occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan, where at least tens of thousands are estimated to have died.
Speaking on September 14 at Lehman College, where he received a Doctor of Humane Letters degree, Mr. Olara Otunnu said that the twenty-year conflict in northern Uganda had led to massive atrocities, destruction, rapes, abductions, and infant mortality and produced an epidemic of HIV/AIDS. More than 1.6 million people have been forcibly relocated to what were effectively concentration camps in “abominable conditions,” he said, while two generations of children have been deprived of education and basic health care. “An entire society,” he said, “is being systematically destroyed in full view of the international community.”
“When the Holocaust exterminated millions of Jews in Europe, we said ‘never again.’ When genocide was perpetrated in Rwanda, we said ‘never again’,” Mr. Otunnu told the audience of 500 students, faculty and staff. “The genocide unfolding in northern Uganda is happening on our watch, and with our full knowledge. Why is there no action? And this humanitarian and human rights catastrophe has been going on non-stop for twenty years.”
Mr. Otunnu served from 1998 until August 2005 as U.N. Under-Secretary General and Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict. In July, he led the effort that culminated in Security Council resolution 1612, which establishes the first comprehensive monitoring and reporting system to protect children in these situations. The resolution includes a “naming and shaming list” of 54 offending parties, rebel groups as well as governments, that are cited for grave violations against children. The groups include government forces in the Congo, Myanmar and Uganda.
Describing the resolution and its reporting and enforcement mechanisms as an “historic development of great consequence,” Mr. Otunnu asked the Lehman audience to pressure those on the “naming and shaming” list, as well as the U.N., to ensure compliance with the measures contained in resolution 1612 in order to “stem the tide of this abomination against children.” According to the U.N., two million children were killed in the last decade, and six million injured or disabled, during situations of armed conflict. In some cases, children were abducted or abused; others were forced into battle as soldiers.
As a student leader at Makerere University in Uganda, Mr. Otunnu helped to lead the resistance against the regime of Idi Amin, who was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans during the 1970s. As the Uganda Minister for Foreign Affairs, he played a prominent role in peace talks that culminated in the 1985 Nairobi Agreement, which sought to end Uganda’s political instability and cyclical violence

Northern Uganda worst place on earth for children
Former UN official calls situation genocide, far worse than Darfur.
Olara Otunnu’s birthplace of northern Uganda is the worst place on earth to be a child today, according to the winner of the 2005 Sydney Peace Prize.
Delivering his Sydney Peace Prize Lecture last Wednesday (Nov. 9) entitled Saving Our Children from the Scourge of War, Mr Otunnu described the human rights catastrophe unfolding in his homeland in Uganda’s north as “methodical and comprehensive genocide”.
“An entire society is being systematically destroyed - physically, culturally, socially and economically – in full view of the international community. I know of no recent or present situation where all the elements that constitute genocide under the Convention of 1948 have been brought together in such a chillingly comprehensive manner as in northern Uganda today,” Mr Otunnu said. “This situation has been going on non-stop for almost 20 years but with a few exceptions, those in a position to raise their voices and to act have instead joined in a conspiracy of silence.”
Olara Otunnu, the former United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, was awarded the 2005 Sydney Peace Prize for his lifetime commitment to human rights and his ceaseless efforts to protect children who are the primary victims of war.
He described the situation in northern Uganda as far worse than Darfur in “its duration, magnitude, and the scope of its diabolical comprehensiveness”. For over 10 years a population of almost two million people (95 percent of the Acholi) have been forcibly uprooted and herded into about 200 concentration camps where they live like animals. An estimated 1,000 people die in these camps each week; over 40 percent of children under 5 years have seriously stunted growth due to malnutrition and two generations of children have been denied education as a matter of policy by the government. He compared the forced relocation of people in northern Uganda to a similar policy conducted by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.
On the other side of the conflict thousands of children have been abducted by the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and recruited as child soldiers and sex slaves.
He said that the population of northern Uganda has been rendered totally vulnerable; they are trapped between the gruesome violence of the LRA and the genocide, atrocities and humiliations which are being systematically committed by the government.
“In Uganda HIV/AIDS has become a deliberate weapon of mass destruction. Government soldiers who have tested HIV-positive are especially deployed to the north to commit maximum havoc on the local girls and women,” Mr Otunnu said.
“For a society which was so renowned for its rich culture, values and family structure - all three have been destroyed under the conditions imposed in the camps. This loss is colossal; it signals the death of a society and a civilization.”

Mr Otunnu used his Sydney Peace Prize to address an urgent appeal - a cri de coeur - to the leaders of the western democracies in particular to take action to stop the genocide in Uganda: “It is with a heavy and anguished heart that I do so. But I must do so in the name of the 2 million people being destroyed in the 200 camps of death and humiliation.” He added, “what will it take, and how long will it take, for leaders for the western democracies to acknowledge, denounce and take action to end the genocide unfolding in northern Uganda? We must denounce and stop genocide wherever it occurs, regardless of the ethnicity or political affiliation of the population being destroyed.”

Olara Otunnu will use his Sydney Peace Prize money ($50,000) as seed money to establish a new international foundation - - the LBL Foundation for Children - - to promote hope, healing and education for children devastated by war.
The foundation will also lobby for full implementation of the groundbreaking UN Security Council Resolution 1612 which was adopted unanimously in July. Resolution 1612 establishes a structured compliance regime to monitor and report serious violations against children in armed conflict situations.
All offending parties, governments as well as insurgents, will continue to be publicly named and identified. The ‘naming and shaming’ list submitted annually to the Security Council lists 54 groups in 11 countries including the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Janjaweed from Sudan which recruit and brutalize children.
The 2005 Sydney Peace Prize was presented to Olara Otunnu by the Governor of NSW, Her Excellency Prof. Marie Bashir AC at a gala dinner in the Great Hall of the University of Sydney on Thursday night, Nov. 10.
The Sydney Peace Prize is presented annually by the Sydney Peace Foundation to recognize outstanding individuals who promote peace with justice. Past winners have included Professor Muhammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh; Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa; former Governor General of Australia, Sir William Deane; Palestinian peace activist, Dr Hanan Ashrawi and Indian writer, Arundhati Roy.


FORMER U.N. UNDER-SECRETARY GENERALCALLS SITUATION IN NORTHERN UGANDA ‘GENOCIDE;’URGES SUPPORT FOR ENFORCEMENT OF U.N. RESOLUTION 1612AIMED AT PROTECTING CHILDREN DURING ARMED CONFLICT

BRONX, NY — A former U.N. Under-Secretary General and Uganda Foreign Minister has called the ongoing violence in northern Uganda “genocide” and said the situation there was far worse than the one occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan, where at least tens of thousands are estimated to have died.
Speaking on September 14 at Lehman College, where he received a Doctor of Humane Letters degree, Mr. Olara Otunnu said that the twenty-year conflict in northern Uganda had led to massive atrocities, destruction, rapes, abductions, and infant mortality and produced an epidemic of HIV/AIDS. More than 1.6 million people have been forcibly relocated to what were effectively concentration camps in “abominable conditions,” he said, while two generations of children have been deprived of education and basic health care. “An entire society,” he said, “is being systematically destroyed in full view of the international community.”
“When the Holocaust exterminated millions of Jews in Europe, we said ‘never again.’ When genocide was perpetrated in Rwanda, we said ‘never again’,” Mr. Otunnu told the audience of 500 students, faculty and staff. “The genocide unfolding in northern Uganda is happening on our watch, and with our full knowledge. Why is there no action? And this humanitarian and human rights catastrophe has been going on non-stop for twenty years.”
Mr. Otunnu served from 1998 until August 2005 as U.N. Under-Secretary General and Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict. In July, he led the effort that culminated in Security Council resolution 1612, which establishes the first comprehensive monitoring and reporting system to protect children in these situations. The resolution includes a “naming and shaming list” of 54 offending parties, rebel groups as well as governments, that are cited for grave violations against children. The groups include government forces in the Congo, Myanmar and Uganda.
Describing the resolution and its reporting and enforcement mechanisms as an “historic development of great consequence,” Mr. Otunnu asked the Lehman audience to pressure those on the “naming and shaming” list, as well as the U.N., to ensure compliance with the measures contained in resolution 1612 in order to “stem the tide of this abomination against children.” According to the U.N., two million children were killed in the last decade, and six million injured or disabled, during situations of armed conflict. In some cases, children were abducted or abused; others were forced into battle as soldiers.
As a student leader at Makerere University in Uganda, Mr. Otunnu helped to lead the resistance against the regime of Idi Amin, who was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans during the 1970s. As the Uganda Minister for Foreign Affairs, he played a prominent role in peace talks that culminated in the 1985 Nairobi Agreement, which sought to end Uganda’s political instability and cyclical violence

THE SECURITY AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMME FOR ACHOLI REGION: A CRITICAL REVIEW(Dr Okee-Obong)

THE SECURITY AND PRODUCTION PROGRAMME FOR ACHOLI REGION: A CRITICAL REVIEW

DDr. Okee-Obong is a Development Planner and a graduate of the Development Study Center, Hebrew University.


Introduction
In June 2003, the then Presidential advisor on Political and Military Affairs in northern Uganda, Lt Gen Salim Saleh unveiled a blue-print for ending the LRA insurgency with a price tag of Shs 4bn, entitled ‘Security and Production Programme’ (SPP). The security and development blueprint envisages setting up economic projects to ‘empower’ the people of the Acholi sub region with a security element through which “people will be trained and adequately facilitated to provide their immediate security, leaving the army to pursue rebels at large without being reduced to guarding homesteads”. [1] Gen Salim Saleh has defended his Sh4b Security and Production Programme (SPP) to participants of a public dialogue at the International Conference Centre in Kampala, contending that it is "counter-hunger, counter-insurgency, counter-redundancy and ultimately counter- poverty, and would turn the displaced camps into settlements with military detachments and provide water points, schools, police, health centres, and other services.” In apparent reference to this programme, President Yoweri Museveni is reported to have earlier on told the participants that there was need for mechanised agriculture around the protected camps to supplement relief food and for the displaced to earn income.[2]

However, the SPP is a controversial project which has met criticism from both the Acholi[3] and a section of the media[4]. For example, during the public dialogue in which Saleh defended his proposal, the majority of participants openly expressed reservation about the project, but instead expressed their interest for immediate peace and an end to the war through a negotiated settlement.[5] Hon. Reagan Okumu (MP Aswa County – Gulu district), in a strongly worded letter to Gen Salim Saleh, questioned the gist of the project and criticised its premises and the approach used to develop it. As for the Acholi Diaspora, the overwhelming majority have rejected it. They see it as a “sinister move by the Government to institutionalise the internally displaced people’s camps”; and they have demanded their immediate dismantling by the Government.[6] Acholi’s disenchantment was summarised by the land administration expert and former MP for Chua County, Mr Livingstone Okello Okello during an Acholi Economic Consultation Meeting in London in August 2005, in this question, “..If the camps were to be turned into permanent settlements or even towns as some people seemed to be working for, what would happen to the entire Acholi-land, which now looks abandoned? Was this SPP a clever or tricky way of opening up Acholi-land to foreign investors?..” [7]

Reading from the reported positive development in the security situation in the sub-region[8], the recent appointment of Gen Salim Saleh as Senior Advisor to the President for the Reconstruction of The Luwero Triangle, Northern Uganda, and The Rwenzori region would suggest that the President is convinced his concept is feasible and viable, irrespective of the critical voices that have been sounded.[9] From the outset, Gen Saleh’s courageous intellectual effort to deal with the two decades endemic violent conflict in Northern Uganda should be commended. His seminal papers offer a rare opportunity for a discussion of a NRM government’s Northern Uganda policy, since its implementation will have far reaching consequences on the conflict and on the lives and welfare of the people in Acholi. But more importantly, I believe discussion of its conformity with some basic modern development principles – Rights Based Approach (RBA) as advocated for in the UN Millennium Development Declaration and Goal (MDG), to which Uganda is a signatory; and the existing situation in Acholi should help improve it and avoid the common pitfalls of numerous earlier attempts, which were based on questionable ideological, conceptualisation and methodological underpinnings.

The discussion is divided into five parts. Part one examines the origin and ideological underpinning of the SPP concept and its relationship to the RBA. In Part two, discussion is made of the problem identification basis of the SPP. And in Part three and four, discussion is made of the different views held about SPP as a security strategy and benevolent or compassionate capitalist system and its implication for peace (security) and development of Acholi. Conclusion and way forward is proposed in Part five.


Origin and ideological underpinning of the SPP concept
Origin of SPP
The idea of the SPP concept for security and production in Acholi sub-region can be traced back to two seminal papers written by Gen. Salim Saleh – namely the “Divinity Union Limited” which outlined ‘the grain belt food basket and security concept’; and the second, a modification of the first, ‘the Security Production Programme’ – unlike its predecessor, it discusses the question of security and production in the IDP camps of Acholi sub-region. Both papers can be found on the Divinity Unity Limited and Saleh Foundation for Humanity websites. [10]

The ideological underpinning of SPP vis-à-vis Rights Based Approach (RBA)
The ideology behind any development programme can be recognised to be the first important step in its planning and development, because it impinges on a number of issues surrounding structuring, institutionalisation, resource mobilisation and implementation. But is this also the case with the SPP? Perusing through the documents, one notices that, like most strategic plans developed on the basis of the ‘modernisation theory’ or the ‘transfer of technology or ideas’ or the ‘Needs Approach’, the SPP lacks a clear ideological underpinning of its own specifically tailored to suit its implementation in the Acholi sub-region. It lingers between militarism and ‘benevolent capitalism’, coached in the ‘top-bottom’ development paradigms of ‘modernisation theory’ (i.e. borrowing from the Israeli Kibbutz[11]), the ‘spill over effect theory’ (i.e. poor people improve their lives from the trickle down effect of capitalist modes of production, in this case large scale commercial farmers), and the ‘Needs approach’[12].

Unlike the currently accepted Rights Based Approach (RBA) to development, these approaches work around outcome goals only; they recognise needs as valid claims (in this case Acholi needs for livelihood survival which has been destroyed by encampment); empowerment is not their concern when it comes to meeting the people’s needs (the people are workers for the commercial farmers); they accept charity as the driving motivation for meeting the people’s needs (Saleh is described in the document as a compassionate capitalist); they focus on manifestation of problems and immediate causes of problems (concern is food shortage in the IDP camps and in the world – security is a secondary cause); and lastly, they focus on social contexts with little emphasis on policy (concern is meeting the social needs - food and money needs and not long-term perspective of the people).

Furthermore, one notices that the inspiration to turn the IDP camps of Northern Uganda into security production programme units (SPPU) derives from the authors’ exposure to the Israeli kibbutz(im). In the implementation of the project, it states; “The project will be run on a cooperative basis, drawing useful experience from the Israeli’s kibbutzim and moshav(im) system which worked effectively for strategic defensive purposes and at the same time providing over 70 percent of the Israel’s food output”.[13] Unfortunately, the authors do not tell the readers the factors behind the formation and success of the Israeli Kibbutzim and moshavim and how this could be relevant to the situation in Northern Uganda – i.e. the origin and the ideology of the Kibbutzim. They only point out the military and production success.

Since Israelis are greatly admired in Uganda because of their military prowess[14] and advances in technology, most Ugandan readers would be inclined to believe that any transfer of ideas from the Kibbutz defence agricultural settlement is good for the country. But this is questionable, because of the different problems, ideologies and methods of work. So what is this Kibbutz defence agricultural settlements exactly and how relevant is it to solving the Northern Uganda political crisis?

Israel Kibbutz defence agricultural settlement in Review
The origin of the Israeli kibbutzim can be to the emergence of Jewish nationalism (Zionism) in 19th Century in Russia. It started as movement for the creation of a Jewish homeland in the cradle of Judaism, Palestine, or, as Jews called it, Eretz Yisrael. Zionism had economic and cultural aspects; and Judaism is an agricultural religion. The first Kibbutz (Degania) was founded in 1910. Its chief economic program was for Jews to abandon inn-keeping, pawn-brokering, and petty selling in favour of a return to the land and its communal cultivation. In addition to having a difficult climate and relatively infertile soils, Ottoman Palestine was in some ways a lawless place. Nomadic Bedouins would frequently raid farms and settled areas. Sabotage of irrigation canals and burning of crops were also common. Living collectively was simply the most logical way to be secure in an unwelcoming land. Sources of its appeal were self transformation, physical security and social support for immigrant adaptation to a new and sometimes hostile environment. Members of a Kibbutz shared three basic premises: co-operative living – all property collectively owned, all work collectively organised, and all living circumstances collectively organised (meals, education, ‘cultural activities’ recreation, etc), and ideally decision making process and administrative duties decided communally.


Questionable Security Production Programme problem analysis
Economic backwardness and plundering as a way of life for the youths of Acholi
The analysis of the causes of the insurgency in Acholi as provided for in the SPP document is questionable. If at all the author consulted the beneficiaries, it is unlikely that Acholi in their right sense would accept the argument that loss of economic means of livelihood was the driving force behind the insurgency. “The insurgency therefore created an alternative way of life of looting and plundering as a means of accessing wealth,” Saleh argues.[15] This is where Saleh's proposal starts off on the mistaken premise – that the northern insurgency is economically driven and ignores - or downplays - the most important political, human rights, democracy, transparency and accountability questions at a wider national level.

The assertion that the insurgency created an alternative way of life of looting and plundering as a means of accessing wealth for the Acholi youth is bordering on insulting the Acholi, and particularly the abducted children who should have in the first place been protected by the ‘mighty’ NRA/UPDF. If all the LRA fighters and their families are summed up since 1987, they are estimated to be about 5,000 – 10,000, this is less than one percent (0.3 – 0.7%) of the 1.5 million Acholi. More specifically, when categorised according to the child age group, they form only about 0.7% of the estimated 750,000 children aged 8 – 18 years. Realistically therefore, this value cannot be used to generalise that plundering is a way of life for the youths in Acholi and it is therefore a justification for the project. Such a contention could be interpreted as the usual NRM ‘hate campaign against the Acholi people’ since there is no substance in it.

Granted that economic ‘backwardness and plundering was a way of life for the youths of Acholi’, would SPP which is based on the Needs Approach successfully address this problem? Unlike the Rights Based Approach (RBA), Needs Approach does not consider poverty (Economic backwardness) as more than lack of resources such as food, health, education, information, participation, etc.., – i.e. as a manifestation of exclusion and powerlessness; it does not consider the realisation of human rights and the process of development as not distinct; in other words, it does not recognise that development is a human right.[16] If it did, would it still be recommending that Acholi should continue living in the dehumanising conditions of the IDP camps and engaged in agricultural production? Under International Humanitarian Law, continued holding of people in IDP camps other than for the express purpose of protecting their lives is a gross violation of human rights and a punishable crime. By ratifying the international human rights treaties, Uganda agreed to be bounded by this international legal obligation. Other than disbanding the IDP camps and developing a new mode of live in Acholi, SPP proposes its institutionalisation. Interpreted differently, the SPP could in the end be seen by the Acholi as a confirmation of NRM’s occupation and subjugation of the people as mere producers of the ‘national food basket’. In the short-run this perception may have no effects on the much sought “peace and stability”, but in the long-run it could generate a kind of “Acholi nationalism” and opposition to the ‘occupier’ and the ‘new exploiters’ (the commercial farmers) which the government of the day could find difficult to bring under control without continued violence, thus pushing the region back to square one.

The problem of endemic corruption
It is generally agreed that corruption with impunity is a major disincentive to development and in project risk analysis it is taken into serious consideration. This was not the case in the SPP – the problem of wanton corruption in public domain[17] was deliberately omitted; an indication that the diagnosis of the factors that have perpetuated the LRA insurgency is inadequate. For close to two decades, the Government has treated Uganda’s corruption gurus with velvet gloves. Various IDP schemes have not been spared from this corruption. A familiar example which immediately comes to mind is the 1998 Vice President Kazibwe’s ‘IDP agricultural production scheme. The scheme is best remembered for doing incomplete shoddy work. For Kazibwe, the tens of idle tractors packed waiting for some work were not good enough for her scheme; she had to bring her own tractors and workers to do the shoddy work! The scheme flopped, the nation was swindled and millions of shillings went down the drain.

The humanitarian disaster in the IDP camps: the priority problem
The fact that the World Conference on Human Rights reaffirmed by consensus the right to development as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights way back in 1993, and more than 12 years after, the authors of the SPP promise to provide this right to the people in the IDP camps of Northern Uganda through their programme raises many questions about the Government’s commitment to its international obligations; more particularly at the moment when the humanitarian situation is at catastrophe level (some have called it genocide): the mortality situation has been categorised as an emergency out of control[18]: the Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) is 2.8/10,000 people per day for the general population, and 5.4/10,000 children per day.[19] IMR stands at a staggering 172/1000 (about twice the national average of 97/1000)[20]; Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates ranges from 13 to 20%[21]) and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) rates ranges from 6 to 9%;[22] HIV infection rate stands at 10 – 15% (11.6%).[23] The maternal mortality rate is about 700/100,000 (compared to national rate of 506:100,000[24]). In the IDP camps, there is a very high rate of traumatisation (30 – 55%)[25] and suicide (2 – 3 per day).

The main causes of this unique and heart breaking human rights violation have been identified, in order of seriousness, as: extremely poor sanitation and hygiene situations; lack of water and food supplies; lack of access to essential health care services due to lack of treatment, few health workers, midwives and medical supplies. Only 29% of the population have access to health centres; very high prevalence of HIV infection; and violent deaths due to insecurity (by both LRA and some members of the UPDF). In this respect, the major pressing problem in Acholi at the moment is the high mortality rate in the IDP camps caused by the policy of encampment and disempowerment of the people compared to the LRA terror per se.[26] After all, the LRA still continue to attack camps and disrupt life. The question of interest therefore is, ‘does dealing with the above problems really need a SPP in order to “turn the displaced camps into settlements with military detachments and provide water points, schools, police, health centres, and other services”? Or does it simply need the political will to correct the administrative weaknesses in the army and the public service and improve coordination? Many observers believe, that outside the comprehensive agricultural component, the SPP is only ‘re-packaging’ what has already been tried since 1986 with little success, i.e. the use of Local Defence Units (LDUs), Arrow Groups and later Home Guards (HG).


Will SPU guarantee peace (security) and development?
Relevance of Kibbutz cooperative experiences in solving the Northern Uganda problem
It is an undisputed fact that the Kibbutz system has contributed significantly to Israel’s security and development, however, in the matter of security, it has not been able to guarantee total security, let alone the fact that it is at the centre of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict.

In drawing useful experiences from the Israeli’s kibbutzim and moshav(im) systems, experts tell us that the historical experiences and conditions should be similar. But is this the case with the problem the SPP concept has analysed in Acholi sub-region? Are the Acholi seeking to create an Acholi homeland in Acholi as if they do not own the land like the Jews? Do the Acholi see the SPP as a national inspiration (nationalism)? Do the Acholi see the SPP as one of the various approaches to solving what some have referred to as ‘the Acholi problem’? In the SPP, are the Acholi trying to preserve or regain their culture? Does the SPP provide any appeals guaranteeing self transformation, physical security and social support in the hostile IDP camp environment? Finally, is an economic programme the priority of the Acholi people right now? The questions are endless and the answers are not clear cut. Thus, unless the author provides convincing answers to the above questions, the long-term success of the programme and its sustainability is questionable as its implementation can only be undertaken under conditions tantamounting to ‘forced labour’, which was not the case with the Kibbutz in Israel. They were heavily funded and built-up, and in many cases people freely occupied them (sometimes with inducement from the state), which is in stark contrast to the situation pertaining to the IDP camps in Acholi.

A major limitation of the application of the ‘Modernisation theory’ is the problem of incompatibility of development ideology, circumstances, resources and methods of implementation. Such limitations have great implication for the application of the kibbutz principles and methods of organisation in Northern Uganda. This is because, the Acholi are not occupying anybody’s land so that they have to form the Israeli kind of defence agricultural settlements. Secondly, the Acholi have neither a “Promised Land” like the Jews nor an aspiration, hope and believe that drives Zionism, for which they have to fight. The rebellion which started in Acholi in 1986 has little if anything to do with land or economic deprivation as outline in the SPP concept; it has its roots in the national political question of injustice, marginalisation and human rights. Would putting them in security production camps solve these problems?

There are therefore great risks in “drawing useful experience from the Israeli’s kibbutzim and moshav(im) system” to solve the political, development and human rights questions that has haunted the area since colonial times. This problem is further aggravated by the failure of the NRM/A right from 1986 to market itself as an attractive political alternative. To the contrary, they engaged in and still continue to engage in the victor mentality twenty years after they have established their firm military grip on the sub-region. This arrogant attitude is also reflected in the introductory part of the SPP concept document which attempted to provide an analysis of the background to the LRA rebellion and identification of the factors that have perpetuated it, which is the rational basis for developing the SPP project.

One of the major arguments for the SPP is that it is an ‘effective counter-insurgency’ strategy, as shown by its application in Israel. Its application is based on the assumption that there will always be insecurity for one reason or another like for the settler Jews. But the Acholi are not settlers, better still, the government has made numerous proclamations that they have already defeated the LRA, so what is the need of a SPP? Why talk of security rather than total peace and full enjoyment of fundamental human rights which the Acholi have been demanding for the last 20 years?

Secondly, while it is true that the Kibbutz system has played a significant role in the State of Israel’s defence, it has not managed to provide total security, let alone solve the conflict with the Palestinians. Frequently, Kibbutzim and Moshavim have come under attack from Palestinians, despite the high-tech and existence of a civil defence force. If the Kibbutzim were the solution to insecurity, questions need to be asked why the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (also known as the father of Jewish Occupation) after many years of hard-line settler politics has finally changed course and engaged in peace dialogue with the Palestinians as the only alternative to peace, to the extent that he disbanded some of the Jewish settlements in Gaza? The conclusion is that the Kibbutzim have not guaranteed security and peace in Israel, and it will not do in Acholi either, given that Uganda is a very poor aid dependant nation. Who knows what kind of negative developments will develop in the SPPU? Today, Israel still mourns one of its most beloved successful leaders, Prime Minister Yitzak Rabbin who was assassinated by a young Jewish extremist, Yigal Amir, born and raised in the Kibbutz. Can the Ugandan leadership and the authors of the SPP instead borrow progressive ideas, other than the transfer of ideas and instruments of occupation, coercion and violence – the Kibbutz? Would Gen Saleh in 20 – 30 years to come want to be another Sharon? Perhaps it is not necessary.

In terms of logical consistency, when one examines the SPP security component justification, one notices a clear contradiction between what the NRM preaches and its practice. NRM more than any other government in the history of Uganda has emphasised the British colonial abuse of the people of Northern Uganda through recruitment in the armed forces[27], and yet in terms of numbers, the NRM has not only massively recruited them in the UPDF, but has literally militarised the whole region. It therefore defeats rational thinking why, if they are critical of the British colonialists or Obote and the Okellos for recruiting northerners in the armed forces, and this argument is used to justify the SPP, they now want to militarise the whole Acholi in a form of military production system- agricultural defence settlement? This, to many people in Acholi is unacceptable. If the problem is shortage of soldiers to guard the camps and pursue LRA, one is tempted to ask; what is the use of the Reserve Force headed by Gen Salim Saleh then? Or, this is ‘an Acholi problem’ and it is not their duty to protect Acholi Ugandans in the IDP camps of Northern Uganda.

Not only that, putting civilian workers under the watchful eye and control of armed men (even if it is argued is their children), particularly after nearly 10 years of experiences of gross abuses by the armed personnel[28] in the IDP camps is something which worries many. It reminds one of the Russian occupation of Vienna, Austria, after the defeat of Nazi Germany. The victorious Russian troops had absolute power. They abused the voluntary reconstruction workers at will and little was done to discipline them. It is therefore doubtful if in only three years, the civil defence personnel to be recruited will be any holier than the present ones stationed in the camps.

The Kibbutz: a production success story but a questionable economic experiment
Although the production success story of the Kibbutzim is undisputed, many times, its economic success has been over romanticised; which could be misleading. When it comes to the financial implications of its operations most of the Kibbutzim were highly subsidized from the Jewish community, particularly the Jewish Agency (JA) and the State of Israel as they were economically insolvent and throughout their life span they were confronted with problems of economic survival.[29] They were provided with all necessary start-up funds when they were first founded, but what its architects and promoters had not originally anticipated was that they would "always be on the government dole, subsidized. The State of Israel had always to come in to meet the deficit. The exact amounts of government support are ‘not known’.

Consequently, towards the 1990s, it was clear that the Kibbutz cooperative agricultural experiments in Israel had economically failed and several reasons have been found to be responsible for the failure (Gordon, 1998). First was the lack of mechanisms to reward exceptional effort, jobs requiring special skills, or additional work time. All members earned the same compensation regardless of what work they did or how well they did it. Conversely, members were not sanctioned for doing poor work. Secondly, although the kibbutzim were important units of production, they were not expected to be economically viable. Smallholders are dependent on the fruits of their labour. If they fail, there was no one to back them up. In a study of moshavim economies, it was found that "expectation of emergency aid from public agencies weakens the pressure felt by members and management to conduct the cooperative's affairs in an efficient, orderly, and disciplined manner" (Gordon, 1998). Based on these findings, Gordon came to the following observations: One, that the kibbutzim do meet the general expectation that cooperative farming and intensive agriculture do not go together. The kibbutzim may well be producing food, but they are doing it at great expense to the Israeli government and various international Zionist organizations. Second, that there must be some other purpose served by the kibbutzim in order for the government to continue to support a failing enterprise – namely the political and defensive role of agricultural settlement patterns in areas where ethnic control over land use rights is contested. She concluded that, “The establishment and continued existence of the kibbutzim is best explained in similar terms of territorial claims to land and defence of borders”.

Strange but true: because of being greatly indebt, in 2001, kibbutz Mishmar David in central Israel, one of those thought to be ‘successful’, voted, 50 to 1, to dissolve. Deeply in debt (like most kibbutzim), it decided to sell off some land to settle its obligations and then to give each member tide to his own dwelling and a share in the kibbutz's factory. This, noted the Jerusalem Post, made Mishmar David "a pioneer among kibbutzim," the first to dismantle itself in order to become "an ordinary Israeli community."


Can ‘benevolent capitalism’ transform Acholi’s welfare?
The architect of the SPP and Divinity Union Ltd (DUL) present it as a unique business, developmental and philanthropic consortium with a “philosophical premise of holistic and integrated symbiosis of compassionate capitalism which harnesses the best of free enterprise to unleash indigenous entrepreneurship empowerment and development”.[30] Granted, but has there ever been any compassionate capitalism ‘technically referred to as benevolent capitalism’? Although there have been attempts to create one since the 1700 by Owen (1771-1858), but the attempts have miserably failed. Believing that it is possible is like believing that there is ‘freedom in Serfdom’. This is because the ideological dogma of capitalism emphasises maximisation of profits and minimisation of costs, and investment in innovative competitiveness.[31]

Although Gen. Salim Saleh’s business acumen and acts of ‘benevolence’ are undoubted, economists and social policy experts caution about illusions of social welfare benefits accruing from ‘benevolent capitalism’. This is because capitalists only invest where there is a profit (or political capital), and they always try to minimise costs – the costs are usually due to labour (wage) bills and social welfare programmes, which they avoid by using cheap labour and scaling down or cutting-off social programmes completely. If SPP is truly a benevolent project, one would expect to see in the proposed outcomes, elements which address the conditions of labour, food, health and the social needs of the people in the SPP units. If it does not, then it will not be any different from the colonial economic policy which focused on the production of market or cash crops.[32]

The SPP choice of crops, namely maize, beans, upland rice and sorghum crops is interesting; and it raises questions about the real motive of the project. Is it to help the near starving people in the IDP camps, or is it intended to line-up the pockets of the commercial farmers? If it is the former, then the nutritious traditional Acholi crops are not amongst those proposed in the project; namely: cereals such as millet (Kal) and sorghum (Kabir); roots such as cassava (Gwana) and sweet potatoes (Layata); Legumes such as beans (Muranga), black eyed beans (Ngor), and pigeon peas (Lapena or Lupindu); oils such as sesame (Nyim), groundnuts (Pul) and shear (Yaa). Maize (Anyogi or Luceri or Mugayiwa) is not included because it is considered a famine crop. If it is cultivated, then it is mostly for brewing or sold to produce buyers in the market. What is known is that currently, there is strong international demand for it in Central and Southern Africa (including Kenya) because of the famine and it is their staple food. Unlike the people of Southern Sudan, the Acholi consider sorghum a famine crop, but due to the increasing bouts of drought, it is being grown for mixing with millet for use as bread (Kwon). In Southern Sudan, however, it is a lucrative crop, since it is staple food. Rice (Mucele) is an international crop associated with the malnutrition disease Rickets in the Asian.

Is the SPP’s choice of crops to be grown just a coincidence? It is unlikely, because the DUL document emphasises production for the large market caused by the current global grain deficit as projected by World Food Programme, Food and Agricultural Organization, and the on-going crisis in the Great Lakes Region, which are likely to impact on food security adversely in the future other than the immediate plight of the people in the IDP camps, namely the ready markets in the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, in addition to the United Nations, World Food Programme, Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies, providing emergency food supply programmes. The real intention of the SPP is stated in the following statement:

As domestic and regional demand grows in related fields of livestock feeds, human consumption and emergency relief services, the corresponding production of grain will serve a growing market until surplus is attained towards a national grain reserve. Divinity Union Limited intends to achieve at least a two year national reserve in five years before Uganda can influence the regional and continental (grain) commodity exchange market. [33]

Comparing the two crop lists, one notices a clear contradiction between the expected results of SPP, i.e. “transformation of the population from dependence on food aid to production of own food….improved feeding especially for children and pregnant women, which will reduce disease and mortality rates” and the identified market or cash oriented crop outputs as opposed to high nutrition food crops to be produced for the three years project period. One would have expected that in the first year (two planting seasons, the emphasis would be on food crops of high nutrition value, other than market or cash crops. Where is the ‘compassion’ in this form of capitalism? Humanitarians recall the tragic Ethiopian famine of the 1980s and the infamous settlement programmes of the Mengistu regime. While Ethiopians were starving to death and malnourished children were being fed on by Vultures, Ethiopia was one of the world’s biggest flower exporter to Europe! A policy initiative gone wrong.

Furthermore, the economic interests of the architects of SPP raise serious ethical concerns. Should the deprived suffering people of IDP camps of Acholi produce the national grain reserve while other peaceful regions with similar climatic conditions are not involved? Is the government insured from future legal action such as those instituted by the Jews against companies which exploited Jewish labour during the Nazi fascism? The SPP experiment in ‘benevolent capitalism’ in a situation in which the people are desperately in need of security to life and basic human needs is a conceptual mix-up and could in the end be self-defeating. What is portrayed as compassionate activities could turnout to be one of the many exploitative self-enrichment schemes.


Implication for peace (security) and development of Acholi
Having outlined the key feature of the SPP concept let me now turn to discussing its implication for peace (security), production and sustainable peace in Northern Uganda and Acholi in particular. Since the SPP is based on the ‘Modernisation theory’ or ‘Needs Approach’ and it focuses on results and physical output – in this case security and production – and not on processes, institutions and policy it is unlikely to change much in Northern Uganda. Such approaches based on the subjective view of the planner(s), as the development work expert Britha Mikkelsen (2004) has observed, tend to counteract flexibility and people’s participation because they are not based on comprehensive analysis of historical development processes, but are set within a management culture which disregards participatory development; in this regard they are unlikely and will never guarantee peace, sustainable livelihood and dignity for the people of Acholi.

Not only that, SPP’s lack of a rallying ideological basis and questionable problem analyses makes its successful operationalisation and implementation difficult, because it does not present a consensual view of the factors sustaining the problem – i.e. the LRA war and the interest of the affected people. It also fails to demonstrate any direct and essential casual relationships between sustainable peace, security and production. That is to say, it has had difficulties in formulating the problem in a way that action can be taken. To identify the problem as lack of security, food and poor conditions in the IDP camps in technical terms is not sufficient, because a problem is not the absence of a solution but an existing negative state. In the case of Acholi, the problem is the humanitarian disaster third degree in the IDP camps– i.e. the unacceptable high rate of infant mortality, malnutrition, crude death rates, human rights abuses, violence against children and women, and cultural extinction; and not lack of security and poverty. LRA insecurity is only one of the factors.

The people in the IDP camps know very well that the cause of this sorry state is both LRA and the UPDF policy of forced encampment; while their Government ignores their plight by refusing to declare the region a disaster region amidst several appeals and a Parliamentary resolution.[34]

The proponents of this project therefore, need to move with cautious when making ambitious assumptions of “winning the hearts and minds of the population”[35] and their subsequent willingness, possible acceptance and participation in the project based on the fact that for close to a decade now (1996 – 2006) they have not revolted (though complained) about their continued stay under the most dehumanising situation in the IDP camps. Right from the start, the architects of encampment had promised them that it would be a short-term stay simply to project them from LRA brutality. The mere fact that the people of Teso and Lango have vehemently demanded to return to their village homes should be a good indicator that the people of Acholi up-till now have cooperated with the Government on this scheme. How will they be convinced after the Teso and Langi have returned to their homes[36] that their case is different and that life in the new IDP camps (Security and Production Unites (SPPU)) is good for them?

It is also not clear how SPP will harmonise the conflict between serving the immediate interest of the people in the IDP camps and its economic ambition of turning Acholi into ‘Uganda’s breadbasket’. Where is the evidence that the people in IDP camps want to be ‘Uganda’s breadbasket’? The common view is that people want the war to end immediately so that they can return to their villages and not stay in camps. This lack of linkage between the interest of the architect of SPP and the primary beneficiaries is likely to undermine the success of the programme as it has great implication for the local people’s acceptance, participation and support for the project. As the saying goes, “you can take a camel to the well to drink water, but you cannot force it to drink”!

Similarly, unless serious consideration is given to dealing with the problem of endemic corruption, the Sh.4.7 billion is neither likely to do any meaningful work in building roads, schools, buying food and medicines, and eventually turning Acholi into ‘Uganda’s food basket’[37], nor provide guaranteed permanent peace, that the people urgently need. It could instead continue to elicit fear and distrust amongst in the local population of Government motives. This fear was echoed in the Monitor editorial of 29th June 2003:

So long as there is lack of political consensus and trust, attempts to build the economy in the north will come to naught because a few rebel raids will destroy all. And, with the level of corruption in Uganda - and in the military especially, you cannot discount the fear that many people along the bureaucracy will simply stand in the queue to line their pockets with this money to the disadvantage of the intended beneficiaries[38].

Conclusion and the way forward
This paper has attempted a critical review of the Security Production Programme (SPP) concept and the author hopes that it has greatly enriched the discussion on the Government’s new economic approach to dealing with the illusive peace in Northern Uganda and in Acholi in particular. Most importantly, the author hopes that the review has opened new grounds for further discussion and improvement of development ideas and programmes intended for Northern Uganda within the framework of the cherished UN Millennium Development Goal’s ‘Rights Based Approach’, which emphasises peace and development as a inalienable human right that the people should demand from the state and the international community and not be given as a favour from the individual good will of ‘benevolent capitalists’ or politicians.

The immediate security and human rights concern is the appalling humanitarian crisis in Northern Uganda – i.e. saving lives by addressing the appalling humanitarian condition in the IDP camps. Thereafter, a clearly thought out and discussed security and development concept which hinges on the ‘Rights Based Approach’ (RBA) and not the ‘Needs Approach’ as proposed by SPP should be developed. RBA will enable the focus on outcomes and process goals (is timeless – not a quick fix solution approach); it will lead to the recognition that rights to development and peace always imply obligations of the state (and not the Acholi to protect and develop themselves or expect the benevolent will of a compassionate capitalist); it shall also enable recognition that rights can only be realised with empowerment (i.e., the beneficiaries owning the institution, process, outcomes and benefits and they have the right to decide what to do with it); it shall enable focusing on structural causes of the problems, as well as manifestations and immediate causes of problems that should be addressed by comprehensive institutional frameworks that outlive individuals and regimes (not concerned with meeting the basic survival needs – such as food and money); and lastly, it shall enable a holistic focus on social, economic, cultural, civil and political context and policy oriented manner (not social contexts with little emphasis on policy but individual good will).

Having made these observations, what is the way forward?. I propose the following:

Genuine olive branch
What is critical is for the government to offer a genuine olive branch to the rebels and agree, unconditionally, to peace talks in a neutral country under the aegis of neutral mediators. Only such a move truly stands a chance of bringing peace and prosperity to northern Uganda which guns and money have failed to do in the last 20 years.

A Rights Based Approach to peace and development
The fact that the overwhelming majority of the Acholi people are opposed to the IDP and their development of as production centres calls for reflection on part of the architects of the SPP. Modern development paradigms being promoted by the United Nations under the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) is Rights Based Approach.

Avoid possible abuse of the labour of the people in the IDPs
While the idea of providing opportunity for the people in IDP camps to earn some money. The SPP should therefore clearly outline the conditions under which the people will be working on their farms or for the commercial farmers based on international labour standards; set up monitoring mechanism to ensure that they are implemented.

Institute flexibility and elicit the beneficiary and stakeholder’s participation
There is need to substitute the ‘planning phobia’ with flexible learning processes with more room for imagination and creativity when dealing with the security and poverty situation in the Acholi sub-region. Any reckless transfer of ideas and technology (modernisation theory or needs approach) based on questionable premises is likely to have a limited impact in the short-run and totally fail in the long-run.

Any proposed security and sustainable livelihood programme should therefore focus on the following factors:
Values: focus on the values of the stakeholders. It should ask and answer questions like: Where are we heading? Is that desirable? What should be done?
Power: Relevant questions: Who wins? Who loses? By which means of power? What are the prospects of changing existing power relations (e.g. military, NGO, politician’s control over the people’s life).
Presence/Engagement: The proposer(s) should be very near (of directly affected by) the problem. He/she should consciously take good note of all reactions and all the positive and negative things said of the problem and proposed solutions. This should create stakeholders who take interest in the programme. Cosmetic problem analysis or deliberate distortion of historical facts as the proposed beneficiaries know it could back-fire – making the proposer(s) part of the problem. On top of this, there is need to use a variety of sources of empirical data in designing such important programmes.
Minutiae: the proposer(s) should start by dealing with the most immediate problem first and then the big one later. This is important for balancing between local priorities and national interests or priorities and international interests.
Use of local resources and practice: The project should focus on the everyday needs and activities, resources and practical knowledge. Use of local resources, knowledge and manpower is more fundamental than discourse and theory.
Context: SPP can only be meaningfully designed in actual context of the situation prevailing in Acholi and not on some hypothetical assumptions.
Process analysis and interpretation of the problems: the problem analysis of the situation in Acholi sub-region should focus on the dynamic question of HOW? Rather than on the structural question of WHY? This approach to problem analysis is important for process perspective interpretation.
Correct historical narrative: This includes actors and events, and development perspectives, are very important for designing effective interventions.
Actor/Structure: It is very important to clearly define and show the operational structure of the programme. The focus should be on the level of actors and the level of structures and on their interrelations in order to avoid the problem of dualistic interpretations and duplicative action.
Dialogue: a cardinal factor for sustainable peace (security) is dialogue and not security and production programmes. The fundamental objective of any sustainable peace programme in the region must express itself as public dialogue in these forms:
§ Dialogue with the LRA
§ Dialogue with experts, analysts or researchers
§ Dialogue with decision-makers and key stakeholders

One last word: The priority of any meaningful ‘benevolence’ is ending human suffering, ensuring peace and full enjoyment of human rights, but not capitalist production.

[END – December 2005]

[1] See "Saleh Wants Shs 4bn To Finish Kony", The Monitor, 28 June.
[2] See Mugisa, A. & Osike, F. 2003: “Commander Saleh Defends Sh 4b Plan On Kony”. New Vision 24th July 2003. Kampala: The New Vision Publications.
[3] Hon. Okumu (MP Aswa County – Gulu district) wrote to Lt Gen Salim Saleh on 15th July 2003.
[4] The Monitor Editor on 29th June 2003 wrote a critical editorial of the SPP (see The Monitor, 2003: “Gen. Saleh’s Shs 4bn Magic Wand Won’t Bring Peace”).
[5] See Mugisa, A. & Osike, F. (2003).
[6] The majority of views expressed on both internet discussion groups – Acholinet and Acholi Forum expressed rejection of the idea and proposal.
[7] See Okello Okello, 2005: “Agriculture and Land Use: Policy Review, Opportunities and Challenges”, p.6. Paper presented at the Acholi Economic Consultation Forum, London, 26 – 28th August 2005.
[8] While in Gulu, President Museveni assured the nation that Kony and LRA were completed annihilated and if he was permitted to cross the ‘Red Line’ by the Government of Sudan, he would finish Kony off in only 30 minutes (see Okot Bitek, “Ugandan President ’I Can Finish Kony in 30 Minutes’ The Daily Monitor, 3. Sept, 2005).
[9] According to the former Military Spokesman, Lt Col. Batariza, this was one of the main considerations for his appointment as Presidential Advisor on the Reconstruction of Northern Uganda, Luwero and Bundibugyo. (See “what the army reshuffles means” New Vision October 25th, 2005)
[10] See Divinity Union Ltd. (2000:1); and Saleh, S. 2003: “Security and Production Programme (SPP): Concept”. p.5.
[11] Saleh, S (2003:3-4).
[12] For further discussion, see Britha Mikkelsen (2004): Methods for Development Work and Research: A New Guide for Practitioners. London: SAGE Publications.
[13] Saleh, S. (2003:5).
[14] Particularly after they successful raided Entebbe Airport and rescued Israel hostages in 1976 during the Idi Amin era; including their war victories over their Arab neighbours in the 1960s and 1970s.
[15] Saleh, S. (2003)
[16] The World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993, reaffirmed by consensus the right to development as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights.
[17] For example, the Purchase of Junk Military Helicopters, Food and Uniform Supplies for the UPDF; Report on Ghost Soldiers in the UPDF; The Sebutinde report on Corruption in the Police Force; the IGG report on corruption in the Department of Education in Gulu district, etc.
[18] When deaths due to the direct impact of war are included, then the figure could be much higher. The KM e-Newsletter impact of the war (death) statistics compiled since June 2004, estimates that to date, 1,064 people have been reported killed by either LRA or UPDF, i.e. about 210 persons per month.
[19] This information is contained in the Medicines sans Frontiers, 2004 report on the situation in the Internally Displaced Camps in Lira and Pader in Northern Uganda.
[20] This information is provided on the District Information Portal, 2004, for Gulu district.
[21] IRIN, 2003 reported on the high malnutrition rate of 31% amongst displaced children in Uganda.
[22] See the US AID, 2004 report on the complex emergency situation in Uganda.
[23] See Uganda Ministry of Health, 2003, HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases Epidemiological Fact Sheet; The Monitor Newsletter (March 1 2005), “HIV Infection Highest in North”.
[24] Huß, S. reports of the humanitarian situation in the report, Human Security Update: Uganda, 2004.
[25] Medicines Sans Frontiers – Holland reports on the Pader mental health community crisis.
[26] For detailed discussion see Obalim, O.J; 2005: Displacement and Disempowerment in Northern Uganda: The challenges of survival and sustainable livelihood. A Field study report (manuscript) London: Kacoke Madit Secretariat.
[27] This argument is also used as a justification for the programme (see Saleh, S. 2003:4).
[28] See HURIFO report, “Caught between two fires”, see Human Rights Watch, (HRW), Report, "Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda" - September 2005, Vol. 17, No.12(A), Rupiny Reporter (2005): “LDUs mutiny in Patong, Agago”, Rupiny, 14. Dec. 2005..
[29]Angela Gordon, A. (1998): “The Ecology and Politics of the Kibbutz”. Ecological Anthropology. Spring 1998, revised 7 October 1998
[30] See Divinity Union Ltd, (2003:1).
[31] See Adam Smith, 1784: The Wealth of Nations. Publishers: Macmillan and Co. Location: London.
[32] The British colonialist emphasised growing of export cash crops cotton and tobacco in the sub-region.
[33] See Divinity Union Ltd. (2003:3).
[34] The Minister in Charge of Security, re-affirms the Government’s rejection to declare the North a disaster region while responding to Odongo Otto’s article “Northern Uganda is a Disaster Area,” New Vision of Nov. 7, 2005 (Okullu, B.A. (2005): “Let us deal with our problem”, 8.Dec. 2005.
[35] This is one of the justifications for using SPP to solve the security problem (see Saleh, S. (2003:4).
[36] Museveni gave directives for IDP camps in Teso and Lango to be disbanded by December this year (See Mulondo, E. (2005): “Museveni wants IDP disbanded”. The New Vision of 6-10. Nov. 2005).
[37] The Divinity Union Limited (DUL) working document emphasises “agricultural revolution” through large scale investment in production through mechanisation and commercialisation and the cooperation with small holders, initially targeting Northern Uganda (Divinity Union Ltd, 2003).
[38] See The Monitor editorial of 29th June 2003s.